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Fraying the Knot
MARITAL PROPERTY, PROBATE, AND PRACTICAL
PROBLEMS WITH TRIBAL MARRIAGE BANS
Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne
†
INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2015, marriage equality advocates
celebrated the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,
which struck down state prohibitions on same-sex marriage.
1
The
Court found that “[t]he right of same-sex couples to marry . . . is
part of the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment.”
2
Two
years earlier, the Court had struck down parts of the federal
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), finding that the federal
government could not discriminate against same-sex married
partners.
3
With these two decisions, the Court ensured that the
marriages of same-sex couples would be recognized by the federal
government and in all fifty states.
Largely left out of the celebration, however, were the
members of nearly a dozen Indian tribes that continue to prohibit
same-sex marriage either expressly or by implication. For these
couples, their tribe’s ban on same-sex marriage remains
untouched by the dictates of both Obergefell and Windsor.
4
†
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of Maryland, College Park, 1999; J.D., University of California, Davis, 2002. Thanks to
Professor Linda Berger, Linda Jellum, and Scott Titshaw for their constructive comments,
suggestions, and encouragement throughout the drafting of this article. Thanks also to the
student members and editors of the Brooklyn Law Review, in particular Megan E. Adams,
Torie Rose DeGhett, Dean Ferrogari, Danielle Robinson, andMuhammad Sardar, for their
hard work shepherding this article through publication. This article has been helped
immeasurably by all of these contributions and I very much appreciate the generosity of
their time. I would also like to thank Mercer law students Tomiya Lewis, Teresa Pardinas,
Giovanna Soto, and Emily Wright, who provided excellent research assistance. I also
appreciate the generous financial assistance from the Mercer Law School.
1
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
2
Id. at 2602.
3
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 775 (2013). DOMA had sought to
define marriage under federal law as limited to “one man and one woman.” 1 U.S.C. § 7,
invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
4
For instance, neither case addressed DOMA’s provision that expressly allows
tribes to deny full faith and credit to same-sex marriages performed in other jurisdictions.
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Instead, whether a tribe permits same-sex marriage rests on
tribes’ inherent authority to govern their own internal affairs.
5
Acting pursuant to their inherent authority, many tribes were
leaders on the issue of marriage equality, legalizing same-sex
marriage when most states prohibited such marriages.
6
Other
tribes, however, like the Navajo Nation, instituted their own laws
(tribal DOMAs) that, like the federal and some state laws, limited
marriages to “one man and one woman.”
7
As a consequence of
tribal DOMAs, a married Indian couple may have their marriage
recognized by their state government and by the federal
government, but not by the government of perhaps their most
important community—their tribe.
Perhaps the most profound effect of tribal DOMAs is their
potential to separate native people from their communities.
8
As
Diné marriage equality activist Alray Nelson has explained:
We can, yes, remove ourselves from our community and go get
married . . . in San Francisco or in Albuquerque or let’s say we go to a
local border town like Farmington or Gallup . . . . But that’s not our
community. That’s not where we’re from. Our songs and those prayers
we were both raised with as traditional young people is located here.
The ceremonies are conducted here.
9
Further, advocates view tribal DOMAs as a rejection of traditional
tribal culture and values, which historically recognized more fluid
notions of gender, multiple gender roles, and same-sex
relationships.
10
See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C; Marcia Zug, Traditional Problems: How Tribal Same-Sex Marriage
Bans Threaten Tribal Sovereignty, 43 MITCHELLHAMLINE L. REV. 761, 770 (2017); Ann E.
Tweedy, Tribal Laws & Same-Sex Marriage: Theory, Process, and Content, COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV., Winter 2015, at 104, 132–33, 146–47; see also Michael J. Klarman, Windsor
and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial Equality, 127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 154 (2013)
(noting thatWindsor did not address provision in DOMA applicable to tribes).
5
See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55–56 (1978).
6
See Amanda J. Crawford, Gay Indians Wed as More Tribes Give Blessings to
Same-Sex Unions, BANGORDAILYNEWS (Nov. 17, 2013), http://bangordailynews.com/2013/
11/17/news/nation/gay-indians-wed-as-more-tribes-give-blessings-to-same-sex-unions/ [htt
ps://perma.cc/WH94-SDR6]. There is some question whether this was the first same-sex
marriage for the tribe. See Steve Russell, The Headlines Are Wrong! Same-Sex Marriage
Not Banned Across Indian Country, INDIANCOUNTRY TODAY (Apr. 23, 2015), http://indian
countrytodaymedianetwork.com [https://perma.cc/4CML-C9HX].
7
1 U.S.C. § 7, invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013);
see Tweedy, supra note 4, at 108.
8
See Jorge Rivas, Gay Marriage Is Still Illegal for the Navajo. This Man Is
Trying to Change That, TULALIP NEWS (July 7, 2015), http://www.tulalipnews.com/wp/
tag/gay-marriage/ [https://perma.cc/45EQ-REDN].
9
Laurel Morales, Supreme Court Ruling on Same-Sex Marriage Doesn’t Apply to
Tribes, FRONTERAS (July 31, 2015), http://www.fronterasdesk.org/content/10087/supreme-
court-ruling-same-sex-marriage-doesnt-apply-tribes [https://perma.cc/TM5N-E8J2].
10
Rivas, supra note 8. According to Alray Nelson, “[i]f they repeal the [Diné
Marriage Act] it brings it back to what our traditional values used to be. They’re using the
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This article focuses on the more mundane effects of tribal
DOMAs, effects that are compounded by the unique overlapping
sovereign issues encountered by tribal members. While most
Americans are governed by federal and state laws, members of
Indian tribes are subject to the laws of their tribe as well. When
state, federal, and tribal laws diverge, as they do in tribes that
prohibit same-sexmarriage, these legal differences may implicate
wide-ranging issues from child custody determinations to pension
benefits to property rights.
With a focus on the latter—property rights—this article
considers how a tribe, like the Navajo Nation, that denies
marriage rights to same-sex couples would dispose of marital
assets upon the death of a spouse who dies without a written
will. Like most Americans, a majority of tribal members die
intestate.
11
Thus, their marital assets will be subject to a probate
code that typically allocates a priority share to the surviving
spouse as a mechanism to ensure financial support for the
surviving spouse and children of the deceased. Unlike most
Americans, however, tribal members are subject to at least three
separate jurisdictional probate codes: (1) the federal American
Indian Probate Reform Act that determines the allocation of the
deceased’s real property held in trust; (2) their tribe’s probate
code; and (3) a state probate code for any property located
outside the reservation such as bank accounts.
12
While the
federal and state probate processes would require a recognition
of the surviving same-sex spouse’s intestate share, the tribe
would deny the surviving spouse his share of his deceased
spouse’s estate. Thus, this article explores how a tribe’s rejection
of same-sex marriage may divest a surviving spouse of an
white man’s language, a foreign way of speaking, to redefine something that was already
sacred and defined, we didn’t need to redefine it at all.” Id. (second alteration in original).
11
Stacy L. Leeds, By Eminent Domain or Some Other Name: A Tribal
Perspective on Taking Land, 41 TULSA L. REV. 51, 68 n.139 (2005) (“Many Indian people,
like their non-Indian counterparts, die intestate.”); see Brian Sawers, Tribal Land
Corporations: Using Incorporation to Combat Fractionation, 88 NEB. L. REV. 385, 402
n.138 (2009) (“The majority of Indians die intestate, although those with greater assets
are more likely to prepare a will.”); Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping
Individuals Opt Out of Intestacy, 53 B.C. L. REV. 877, 878 (2012); Maggie Germano,
Despite Their Priorities, Nearly Half of Americans over 55 Still Don’t Have aWill, FORBES
(Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maggiegermano/2019/02/15/despite-their-
priorities-nearly-half-of-americans-over-55-still-dont-have-a-will/#3c42e0315238
[https://perma.cc/PX5A-NDGX].
12
SeeMARYE. GUSS, AMERICAN INDIAN PROBATE REFORM ACT: WRITINGWILLS
FORTRIBALCLIENTS 18–19 (2017), nptao.arizona.edu/sites/nptao/files/aipra-writing_wills_
for_tribal_clients.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JHY-QM6H]; 25 U.S.C. § 2206; Douglas R. Nash &
Cecelia E. Burke, The Changing Landscape of Indian Estate Planning and Probate: The
American Indian Probate Reform Act, 5 SEATTLE J. FORSOC. JUST. 121, 121, 157 (2006); see
also discussion of probate and marital property infra Part II.
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intestacy share on account of sex and how that conflicts with
federal and state law that prohibits such discrimination.
Because the Navajo Nation is the largest tribe, and because
smaller tribes often follow its direction, this article focuses
primarily on theNavajo Nation.
13
Part I of this article discusses the
disparity between the three sovereigns—state, federal, and
tribal—regarding marriage equality. Part II explains the federal,
state, and tribal probate code that would most likely govern a
Navajomember’s estate. Part III further considers the implications
of the refusal to recognize same-sex marriage in intestacy
proceedings. Part IV proposes that, consistent with tribal
sovereignty, tribes should grant full faith and credit or comity to
same-sex marriages performed outside the tribe’s jurisdiction.
While a tribe may opt not to solemnize a marriage, refusing to
recognize a marriage lawfully undertaken in another jurisdiction
denies property rights to surviving spouses and undermines the
ability of spouses to support each other and their offspring.
I. MARRIAGE EQUALITY& TRIBAL LAW
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of same-sex
marriage in United States v. Windsor.
14
There, the State of New
York had extended marriage rights to same-sex couples,
recognizing the marriage of Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer, who
had married in Ontario, Canada.
15
When Spyer died, Windsor
attempted to employ the surviving spouse exemption from
federal estate taxes.
16
However, her use of the exemption was
denied under the federal Defense of Marriage Act, which defined
marriage as between one man and one woman for the purposes
of all federal statutes.
17
While New York opted to confer “a
dignity and status of immense import” upon its citizens, DOMA
acted “for the opposite purpose—to impose restrictions and
13
See Pauly Denetclaw, A Native Embassy Row? Navajo Nation Is Looking for a
DC Home, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Mar. 18, 2019), https://newsmaven.io/indiancountry
today/news/a-native-embassy-row-navajo-nation-is-looking-for-a-dc-home-mYTKMERKCU
eHnWFnmrnx9A/ [https://perma.cc/LV4R-K8MF] (describing Navajo Nation’s population
and advocacy role as well as requests for support from other tribes).
14
See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 751–52 (2013).
15
Id. at 753.
16
Id. at 750.
17
See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 753. Section 3 of DOMA provides:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and
agencies of the United States, the word “marriage” means only a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word “spouse”
refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.
1 U.S.C. § 7, invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
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disabilities.”
18
In striking down DOMA, the Court expressed its
disapproval of the federal government’s refusal to recognize a
lawful marriage officiated in Canada and accepted as legal in the
petitioner’s home state. Ultimately, the Court concluded that, by
seeking “to injure the very class New York seeks to protect,”
DOMA “violates basic due process and equal protection
principles applicable to the Federal Government.”
19
In concluding that DOMA violated the equal protection
and due process clauses of the Fifth Amendment, the Windsor
Court was particularly troubled that DOMA created
two contradictory marriage regimes within the same
State, . . . forc[ing] same-sex couples to live as married for the purpose
of state law but unmarried for the purpose of federal law, thus
diminishing the stability and predictability of basic personal relations
the State has found it proper to acknowledge and protect.
20
Further, same-sex couples were forced into a second-tier of
marriage, one that would be recognized by their state, but not
the federal government.
21
For the Court, such a result serves to
humiliate the children within these marriages and to undermine
family integrity and closeness.
22
Moreover, the Court found that
DOMA imposed burdens on same-sex couples that touch “many
aspects of married and family life,” preventing couples from
receiving federal benefits for which they would otherwise be
eligible.
23
Finally, the Court was concerned that DOMA “divests
married same-sex couples of the duties and responsibilities that
are an essential part of married life and that they in most cases
would be honored to accept were DOMA not in force.”
24
These
responsibilities include the duty of each spouse to support each
other.
25
At a minimum, equal protection means that Congress
could not justify disparate treatment of a politically unpopular
group simply out of a desire to harm that group.
26
For similar reasons, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court
concluded that state prohibitions on same-sex marriage violated
both the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and equal
protection clauses.
27
In considering due process, the Court noted
18
Windsor, 570U.S. at 768 (“What the State ofNewYork treats as alike the federal
law deems unlike by a law designed to injure the same class the State seeks to protect.”).
19
Id. at 769–70 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V).
20
Id. at 772.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 773.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 770 (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973)).
27
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015).
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that it had long held that marriage is a fundamental right
protected by the Constitution.
28
As a fundamental right, the
state could not deprive a citizen of the right to marry without
due process. In addressing the due process question, the Court
considered the myriad benefits couples receive from the state
precisely because of their marriage, concluding that same-sex
couples were unjustly deprived of these benefits by prohibiting
them to marry.
29
In addition to depriving same-sex couples’
material benefits, state prohibitions also deprived them of the
stability opposite-sex couples enjoy.
30
Excluding same-sex
couples frommarriage communicated to the public that gays and
lesbians were not equal and were not welcome to participate in
one of the most building blocks of American society—marriage.
31
While noting that marriage was an evolving institution,
the Court emphasized the lifelong union of the married couple as
a “[promise of] nobility and dignity to all persons, without regard
to their station in life.”
32
Marriage matters now because it has
always mattered. As the Court explained, that marriage was
fundamental to human beings was demonstrated by its presence
throughout much of human history and within a variety of human
cultures.
33
In finding that bans on same-sexmarriage violated due
process, the Court concluded that the fundamental right of
marriage recognized by the Constitution applied “with equal force
to same-sex couples.”
34
Indeed, to exclude same-sex couples would
conflict with the underlying basis for the right to marry itself.
35
Next, the Court considered marriage prohibitions in light of
the equal protection clause. Recognizing the often-“interlocking
nature” of the equal protection and due process clauses, the Court
leaned on its due process analysis to likewise conclude that the equal
28
Id. at 2598.
29
Id. at 2601. The Court cited the following as examples of the benefits and
responsibilities attached to marital status:
taxation; inheritance and property rights; rules of intestate succession; spousal
privilege in the law of evidence; hospital access; medical decisionmaking
authority; adoption rights; the rights and benefits of survivors; birth and death
certificates; professional ethics rules; campaign finance restrictions; workers’
compensation benefits; health insurance; and child custody, support, and
visitation rules.
Id.
30
Id. at 2601–02.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 2593–94.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 2599.
35
Id. at 2600 (“Excluding same-sex couples from marriage thus conflicts with
a central premise of the right to marry.”).
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protection clause required the right of same-sex couples to marry.
36
For the Court, same-sex marriage bans were by their very nature
unequal because they denied same-sex couples the opportunity to
enjoy the benefits marriage conferred on opposite-sex couples.
37
Given the “long history of disapproval of their relationships, this
denial to same-sex couples of the right to marry works a grave and
continuing harm[ ] . . . [and] serves to disrespect and subordinate
them.”
38
Moreover, the bans denied same-sex couples the equal
ability to exercise the fundamental right to marry as that afforded
to opposite-sex couples.
39
Thus, the Court concluded, the Equal
Protection Clause likewise prohibited states from denying same-sex
couples the fundamental right to marriage.
40
While its invocation of the universality of marriage and
dignity is compelling, Obergefell does not apply to tribal same-sex
marriage prohibitions because the constitutional restrictions only
extend to limit state and federal authority, not the authority of
tribal governments.
41
Instead, tribal government power is
restricted by tribal constitutions and by the Indian Civil Rights Act
(ICRA).
42
While certain protections within the Bill of Rights are
incorporated into ICRA, that statute does not embody all of the
individual rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution.
43
Of
importance here, ICRA requires that tribes ensure equal protection
and due process to every person within their jurisdiction.
44
The
applicability of equal protection and due process might suggest
that Obergefell’s reliance on these two clauses would therefore
36
Id. at 2603–06 (discussing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
37
Id. at 2604.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Zug, supra note 4, at 770 (“Indian tribes . . . [are in] ‘a semi-independent
position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as states, not as nations, not as
possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of
regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of
the Union, or of the state within whose limits they resided.’” (quoting Talton v. Mayes, 163
U.S. 376, 384 (1896))); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 4.01(1)(a)
(Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2017) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK] (“Tribal powers of self-
government are recognized by the Constitution, legislation, treaties, judicial decisions, and
administrative practice.”).
42
See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–03.
43
See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 383 (1896) (concluding Fifth Amendment did
not apply to tribal government because Indian tribes are “distinct, independent political
communities, retaining their original natural rights” that predate Constitution (citation
omitted)); see also United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769, 777 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that
individual constitutional rights did not apply to Indian tribal governments), abrogated on
other grounds by Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001); Note, The Indian Bill of Rights and the
Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1343, 1348 (1969).
44
25 U.S.C. § 1302 (a)(8) (“No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-
government shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its
laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law . . . .”).
478 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:2
apply to tribal governments. However, as the Court explained in
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, tribes are not bound by the federal
courts’ interpretation of equal protection or due process.
45
In Santa Clara Pueblo, the Court concluded that while
ICRA contained protections for tribal citizens, those protections
were not the same as those contained in the federal
Constitution.
46
Rather, because ICRA is designed both to protect
individual Indians’ civil rights vis-à-vis their tribal government
and to protect the tribes’ sovereignty and right of self-
determination, tribal courts were not bound by federal court
decisions interpreting an equivalent constitutional right.
47
Instead, tribal courts should interpret equal protection challenges
brought under ICRA in light of tribal sovereignty and tribal
values.
48
Indeed, tribal courts were not obliged to follow Anglo-
American standards of equal protection that would conflict with
tribal values or “harm the ‘cultural identity’ of Indian tribes.”
49
According to the Court, ICRA itself demanded this result, an
interpretation demonstrated by ICRA’s selective extension of
constitutional rights to tribal governments to account for different
social, cultural, and economic needs of the tribe and its
government.
50
Pursuant to Santa Clara, tribal courts were
principally responsible for interpreting tribal government’s
obligations under ICRA.
51
In so doing, tribal courts were “free to
consider tribal customs and traditions in their decisions”
regarding equal treatment.
52
In short, tribal governments ultimately decide how ICRA
is applied.
53
Further, while their authority is subject to Congress’s
plenary power, with the exception of ICRA,
54
“tribes have
generally had the unfettered discretion to enact whatever laws
and procedures they chose to govern themselves.”
55
Internal tribal
45
See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60–72 (1978); see also Zug,
supra note 4, at 772–73.
46
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 57; see Zug, supra note 4, at 770.
47
Zug, supra note 4, at 770.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 772–73 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 54).
50
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 62–63 (“[R]ather than providing in wholesale
fashion for the extension of constitutional requirements to tribal governments, . . . [ICRA]
selectively incorporated and in some instances modified the safeguards of the Bill of Rights
to fit the unique political, cultural, and economic needs of tribal governments.”).
51
Zug, supra note 4, at 772–73.
52
Id. at 773.
53
Id. at 773 (citing Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 71).
54
See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–03.
55
B.J. Jones, Tribal Considerations in Comity and Full Faith and Credit Issues,
68 N.D. L. REV. 689, 690 (1992); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 41, § 4.01(1)(a)
(“The right of tribes to govern their members and territories flows from a preexisting
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governance, including marriage and inheritance, is largely left to
tribal government jurisdiction.
56
For same-sex married couples,
this means tribes may ignore Obergefell and its discussion of the
historical and cultural treatment of marriage in favor of their own
tribal custom and tradition.
57
Obergefell’s reasoning might be
persuasive to an Indian court, but it is not binding authority.
58
BeforeObergefell, the issue of tribal recognition of marriage
was typically driven in the other direction. That is, while state
same-sex marriage prohibitions were in effect, tribes were in the
position of recognizing same-sex marriage within states that did
not.
59
For instance, in 2013, Darren Black Bear, a tribal member,
and Jason Pickel became the first same-sex couple to legally wed
in Oklahoma.
60
Rather than marry out of their home state, the
couple opted to marry on the Cheyenne and Arapaho reservations
after the tribes agreed to grant the couple a marriage license.
61
At
the time of their marriage, Black Bear and Pickel’s marriage was
not recognized in their home state of Oklahoma.
62
Nine years
sovereignty limited, but not abolished, by their inclusion within the territorial bounds of
the United States.”).
56
SeeMontana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981); Santa Clara Pueblo,
436 U.S. at 65, 71; United States v. Jarvison, 409 F.3d 1221, 1224–25 (10th Cir. 2005); see
also Jones, supra note 55, at 690 (noting Indian Reorganization Act authorized tribes “to
enact their own laws and to be governed by them”); COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 41,
§ 4.01(1)(a) (“Indian tribes consistently have been recognized . . . as ‘distinct, independent
political communities,’ qualified to exercise the powers of self-government, not by virtue of
any delegation of powers, but rather by reason of their original tribal sovereignty.” (footnote
omitted) (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832))).
57
Zug, supra note 4, at 773 (citing Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. 49).
58
See Montana, 450 U.S. at 564 (“Indian tribes retain their inherent power to
determine tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations among members, and to
prescribe rules of inheritance for members.”).
59
Zug, supra note 4, at 769, 769 n.44.
60
Crawford, supra note 6. Although Pickel was not a member of the tribe, the
tribe’s code requires only one member of the couple be a tribal member. Lisa De Bode,Native
American Tribes Challenge Oklahoma Gay Marriage Ban, AL JAZEERA AM. (Oct. 22, 2013),
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/10/22/native-american-tribeschallengeoklahoma
gaymarriageban.html [https://perma.cc/5KPZ-6QH2]. There is somequestion onwhether this
was the first same-sex marriage for the tribe. See Russell, supra note 6.
61
De Bode, supra note 60.
62
Mark Joseph Stern, How Did a Gay Couple Legally Marry in Oklahoma?,
SLATE (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2013/10/25/native_american_
gay_marriage_is_legal_in_oklahoma_how_does_that_work.html [https://perma.cc/4299-
JKCF]. The two men were married under a license issued by the Cheyenne and Arapaho
Tribes. Id. According to the tribes’ law, the marriage must occur on tribal land and one
of the couple must be a tribal member. However, the tribes’ marriage license did not
specify the sex of the couple. De Bode, supra note 60. Three months after Black Bear and
Pickel married, a federal district court struck down Oklahoma’s ban on same-sex
marriage. Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1258 (N.D. Okla.
2014), aff’d on other grounds, Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014). Following
the reasoning of Windsor, the court held that the ban violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1296. According to the court, the ban on
same-sex marriage constituted an “arbitrary, irrational exclusion of just one class of
Oklahoma citizens from a governmental benefit.” Id. More specifically, the court noted
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earlier, Oklahomans had voted to amend the state constitution to
limit marriage to one man and one woman.
63
While their home
state would not recognize their marriage, what mattered to Black
Bear was that his tribe—and the federal government—would
recognize the legality of his marriage.
64
The same reasoning that made Black Bear and Pickel’s
marriage valid, also means that tribesmay refuse to recognize the
marriages of tribal citizens married under state law that now
must recognize same-sex marriage. As sovereign nations, tribal
governments have the inherent authority to define marriage
under tribal law. How a tribe regulates marriage depends upon
the tribe. Some tribes, such as the Blackfeet, rely on state law for
defining marriage.
65
For those tribes that rely on state law for
their marriage law, the rules may have become more consistent
after the Obergefell decision because those tribes would, like all
states, permit same-sex marriage.
However, many tribes follow their own tribal law with
respect to marriage.
66
This is true “even where a tribe adopts a
definition of marriage contrary to the federal or state definitions,
[thus] the tribe will prevail in defining marriage as it pertains to
the tribe’s members.”
67
When Obergefell was decided, twelve
tribes currently allowed same-sex marriage either as a matter of
tribal law or expressed tribal policy.
68
Still others have marriage
laws that use gender-neutral language that have been interpreted
to encompass marriage equality.
69
And finally, two tribes permit
that the state constitutional measure “purposefully [drew a line] between two groups of
Oklahoma citizens—same-sex couples desiring an Oklahoma marriage license and
opposite-sex couples desiring an Oklahoma marriage license.” Id. at 1285. Finding no
rational basis for this discriminatory treatment, the court found the prohibition violated
the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 1296.
63
Sean Murphy & Tim Talley, US Appeals Court Says Oklahoma Must Allow
Gay Marriage; Governor Says Court Tramples on Voters, U.S. NEWS &WORLD REP. (July
18, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2014/07/18/court-rules-for-gay-marria
ge-in-oklahoma-case [https://perma.cc/NTW2-U8KG] (noting that the constitutional
amendment was approved by seventy-six percent of Oklahoma voters in 2004).
64
Crawford, supra note 6. According to Black Bear, “[m]y tribe recognizes it and
what matters is that the federal government recognizes it.” Id.
65
For instance, Blackfeet Tribal Law declares that “[a]ll members of the Blackfeet
Indian Tribe shall hereafter be governed by State Law and subject to State Jurisdiction with
respect to marriage hereafter consummated. Common-law marriages and Indian Customs
marriage shall not be recognized within the Blackfeet Reservation.” BLACKFEETTRIBALLAW
ANDORDERCODE, ch. 3 § 1 (Marriage).
66
Julie Bushyhead, The Coquille Indian Tribe, Same-Sex Marriage, and
Spousal Benefits: A Practical Guide, 26 ARIZ. J. INT’L&COMP. L. 509, 530 (2009) (“[T]he
United States Supreme Court recognizes tribal authority to grant valid marriage
licenses and similarly dissolve tribal marriages.” (citing COHEN’SHANDBOOK, supra note
41, § 4.01(2))).
67
Id.
68
Tweedy, supra note 4, at 110.
69
Id. at 110–11.
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same-sex marriage by incorporating state law into tribal
marriage law.
70
Most tribes require that at least one member of
the couple be a tribal member for themarriage to take place under
tribal authority.
71
In contrast, at least eleven tribes have tribal laws
prohibiting same-sex marriage either expressly or by
implication.
72
Tribes have expressly forbidden it through “tribal
DOMAs” that, like the now defunct state restrictions, limit
marriage to “one man and one woman.”
73
Other tribal marriage
statutes employ “sex-specific language that may or may not have
been intended to bar same-sex marriage.”
74
Consequently, more
than half a million tribal citizens are affected by tribal DOMAs.
75
One of those tribes to enact a tribal DOMA is the Navajo
Nation. The Navajo Nation is the largest Indian nation within the
United States.
76
With more than 250,000 citizens, its reservation
spans three states—NewMexico, Utah, and Arizona.
77
The Navajo
Nation Council passed the Dineғ Marriage Act in 2005.
78
The Act
limits marriage to relationships between a woman and a man and
declares that same-sex marriages are “void and prohibited.”
79
Marriage is of great importance in traditional Navajo society. “A
traditional Navajo marriage, when consummated according to a
prescribed elaborate ritual, is believed to be blessed by the ‘Holy
People.’ This blessing ensures that the marriage will be stable, in
harmony, and perpetual.”
80
Because of the Diné Marriage Act,
same-sex couples are placed outside this important tradition and
blessing. Despite vigorous challenges by tribal activists, theNation
continues to prohibit same-sex marriage.
81
70
Id. at 111.
71
See id. at 116.
72
See Zug, supra note 4, at 769 n.45.
73
Tweedy, supra note 4, at 108, 136.
74
Id. at 104; see also Julie Turkewitz, Among the Navajos, a Renewed Debate
About Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1zWzPZf [https://perma.
cc/VU22-R4YM] (describing varied tribal approaches to same-sex marriage). Tribes that
prohibit same-sex marriage include “Navajo Nation, Blue Lake Rancheria, Chickasaw
Nation, Confederated Tribes of the Coos, Lower Umqua, and Siuslaw Indians, Grand
Traverse Band of Chippewa Indians, Nez Perce Tribe, the Oneida Indian Nation, the Sac
& Fox Tribe of the Mississippi in Iowa, and the Muscogee (Creek) Nation.” Tweedy, supra
note 4, at 131–32 (footnotes omitted).
75
See Zug, supra note 4, at 769.
76
See U.S. CENSUSBUREAU, C2010BR-10, THE AMERICAN INDIAN ANDALASKA
NATIVE POPULATION: 2010 (2012).
77
See Official Site of the Navajo Nation: History, NAVAJONATION, http://www.
navajo-nsn.gov/history.htm [https://perma.cc/FS3S-6BX5].
78
NAVAJONATION CODE ANN. tit. 9 § 2(c).
79
Id.
80
Navajo Nation v. Murphy, 6 Navajo Rptr. 10, 13 (Navajo 1988).
81
Given that their sovereign status permits tribes to define marriage, it is perhaps
perplexing that Congress nonetheless included a provision in DOMA directly implicating tribal
governments. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C; Tweedy, supra note 4, at 133. Specifically, under DOMA,
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Consequently, a tribal member seeking tomarry his same-
sex partner may have his marriage recognized by his state and
the federal government, but not by his tribe. Because of the
intertwining of tribal and federal governments with respect to
participation in tribal life, this conflict over recognition could be
profound for the individual tribal member. In short, tribal citizens
seeking same-sex marriage rights could end up caught between
competing sovereigns over the recognition of their marriage. Of
particular interest here, in the event one spouse dies intestate,
the lack of recognition can divest the surviving spouse of her share
of her spouse’s estate.
II. PROBATE&MARTIAL PROPERTY
Just as tribes may define marriage for their members,
tribal governments also exercise jurisdiction over tribal members’
property.
82
This includes the disposition of marital property when
a married person dies intestate.
83
For those tribes that prohibit
same-sex marriage, that decision comes into conflict during
probate, where a deceased’s estate may be subject to federal,
state, and tribal law.
84
While the state and federal government
would respect the couple’s rights in marital property, the tribe
would not. In this way, the tribe’s refusal to recognize same-sex
marriage can divest a surviving spouse of property obtained
during an otherwise lawful marriage.
85
Moreover, tribal DOMAs
can also unnecessarily complicate an already complex Indian
probate process. This section will explain the complexities of the
probate process for Indians who die intestate.
Probate in Indian Country is divided between nontrust
and trust property, and there is a potential for multiple
Indian tribes are not required to give full faith and credit to “any public act, record, or judicial
proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State,
territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738C. By this provision, tribal governments would not be required to recognize the same-sex
marriages of couples married in another state or tribal jurisdiction. This portion of DOMAwas
not changed byObergefell orWindsor. Id.
82
SeeMontana v. United States, 450U.S. 544, 564 (1981) (“Indian tribes retain their
inherentpower todetermine tribalmembership, to regulatedomestic relationsamongmembers,
and to prescribe rules of inheritance for members.”); Bushyhead, supra note 66, at 529.
83
Montana, 450 U.S. at 564; Bushyhead, supra note 66, at 529.
84
SeeKristina L. McCulley, Comment,The American Indian Probate ReformAct
of 2004: The Death of Fractionation or Individual Native American Property Interests and
Tribal Customs?, 30 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 401, 412 (2006) (“[T]he application of different
rules of intestate succession to each interest of a decedent in or to trust or restricted land
if that land is located within the boundaries of more than 1 State . . . makes probate
planning unnecessarily difficult” (quoting American Indian Probate Reform Act,, Pub. L.
No. 108-374, 118 Stat. 1773 (2004))).
85
See Bushyhead, supra note 66, at 529.
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jurisdictions to be implicated in the probate process.
86
Under the
trust relationship between Indians and the federal government,
Indians hold property as beneficiaries with the U.S. government
acting as trustee.
87
Consequently, probate proceedings for real
property in Indian Country largely concern title to individual
allotments held in trust or as restricted land.
88
Because the
federal government holds those lands in trust, individual owners
are unable to fully alienate their trust or restricted property
during their lives or to devise their trust or restricted property
upon their death.
89
The trust relationship also impinges on the
tribes’ ability to distribute property according to its own customs
and probate laws.
90
In contrast, probate of nontrust property is
dependent upon the place of domicile, and thus governed by
either tribal or state law.
91
A. Trust Property Under the American Indian Probate
Reform Act
For most Americans, disposition of their assets depends
upon the jurisdiction of the state in which the property is
located. For Indian families, the issue is more complex. Property
owned by Indians is potentially subject to federal probate law in
addition to state and tribal laws depending upon the type of
property owned and its location.
92
Federal jurisdiction applies to
“trust property,” the real property that is held by the federal
government as part of its trust relationship with Indian people.
93
Under this scheme, Indians hold property as beneficiaries, with
the U.S. government acting as trustee.
94
The disposition of trust,
86
See Nash & Burke, supra note 12, at 133 (discussing intestate succession and
noting that “[f]or Indians, at least two, and potentially three, sets of jurisdictional laws can
apply: federal law for trust assets only, tribal law for all non-trust assets located within the
jurisdiction of the tribe, and state law for non-trust assets located off reservation and under
state jurisdiction”); McCulley, supra note 84, at 410, 412 (describing problems of multiple
states having jurisdiction over trust property).
87
McCulley, supra note 84, at 404.
88
Id. at 406. “Allotments” are individual parcels of land, “typically [one hundred
sixty] acres, that either the federal government holds in trust for individual tribal members
or tribal members hold in fee, subject to certain federal restrictions on alienation.” Id. at
407 (footnote omitted). “[T]rust land” refers to the arrangement by which the United States
holds title to land for the benefit of an individual Indian. Id. “Restricted land” is land for
which an individual Indian holds title but can only alienate or encumber the land with the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior. Id. (citing 25 C.F.R. § 15.2 (2005)).
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Nash & Burke, supra note 12, at 133.
92
See Nash & Burke, supra note 12, at 133; McCulley, supra note 84, at 412.
93
Id.
94
Id.
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or “restricted,” property held by Indians is controlled by the
American Indian Probate Reform Act of 2004 (AIPRA).
95
Congress passed AIPRA in an effort to stop the
increasing fractionalization of undivided interests in trust and
restricted lands and to instill some coherence to the distribution
of Indian property.
96
Fractionalization resulted from the federal
government’s efforts to break up Indian communal ownership of
lands and to spur Indian assimilation.
97
Its primary mechanism
was the General Allotment Act of 1887, also known as the Dawes
Act.
98
Under the Dawes Act, Indian land was divided into
individual allotments that were granted to individual Indian
allottees.
99
Allottees would occupy the land as beneficiaries with
the U.S. government holding title as trustee.
100
Allottees were
expected to work the land for a certain period of time under the
temporary tutelage of the U.S. government, which doubted the
allottees’ abilities to tend to their land independently.
101
More
important for this article’s purpose, federal law provided no
guidance on intestate succession of allotted parcels.
102
For their
part, tribes were not permitted to follow tribal law or custom in
disposing of trust property upon the death of the allottee.
103
Instead, intestacy statutes of the state in which the allotment
was located controlled its distribution.
104
Consequently, allotted
parcels were often divvied up amongst several heirs, increasing
fractionalization as Indian trust property came to be held by an
increasing number of beneficiaries.
105
Compounding this was the
restriction on allottees from alienating their land, which
prevented any consolidation of beneficiary ownership.
106
95
American Indian Probate Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-374, 118 Stat.
1773 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C. (2006)). AIPRA’s provisions
governing intestate succession became effective on June 20, 2006. In re Estate of Anita
Adakai, 61 IBIA 2, 3 n.3 (2015). AIPRA applies to trust and allotted land, which is located
primarily in the west where the Navajo Nation is. GUSS, supra note 12, at 1. While AIPRA
contains exemptions or specific provisions for some states, this article will focus on the
general provisions.
96
American Indian Probate Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-374, 118 Stat.
1773 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C. (2006)).
97
Anthony J. Franken, Dealing with the Whip End of Someone Else’s Crazy:
Individual-Based Approaches to Indian Land Fractionation, 57 S.D. L. REV. 345, 349 (2012).
98
Id. at 348.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 350.
103
Id.
104
Franken, supra note 97, at 350; see also McCulley, supra note 84, at 408;
Nash & Burke, supra note 12, at 127.
105
Franken, supra note 97, at 350.
106
Id.
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By 1910, federal law permitted property to be devised by
will and defined the probate process for trust assets.
107
The
concept of a will, however, was unfamiliar to most Indians at
that time and the requirement that the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA) approve every will was burdensome.
108
Ultimately, most
allottees died intestate.
109
Consequently, until AIPRA’s passage,
a combination of state and federal law continued to govern the
inheritance of trust and restricted property.
110
AIPRA is the result of Congress’s conclusion that reliance
on state intestacy statutes had created an unworkable and
needlessly complex probate planning process.
111
Specifically,
Congress concluded that reliance on state law had resulted in an
“increasingly fractionated ownership of trust and restricted land
as that land is inherited by successive generations of owners as
tenants in common.”
112
This fractionated ownership was further
complicated when trust property was located in more than one
state.
113
Further, Congress was concerned with “the absence of a
uniform general probate code for trust and restricted land, which
made it difficult for Indian tribes to work cooperatively to
develop tribal probate codes.”
114
Through AIPRA, Congress sought to create a uniform
probate code to govern interests in trust or restricted parcels and
to facilitate and incentivize probate planning assistance and estate
planning.
115
Further, Congress encouraged tribal governments to
develop their own tribal probate codes consistent with the Indian
107
Franken, supra note 97, at 352; see also McCulley, supra note 84, at 407
(noting that trust system prevented Indian people from devising their property by will);
Nash & Burke, supra note 12, at 129.
108
Franken, supra note 97, at 352.
109
Id.
110
Nash & Burke, supra note 12, at 131.
111
See American Indian Probate Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-374,
§ 2(3)(A)–(D), 118 Stat. 1773, 1773–74 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25
U.S.C. (2006)); Nash & Burke, supra note 12, at 122.
112
American Indian Probate Reform Act § 2(3)(A), 118 Stat. at 1773.
113
Id. § 2(3)(B).
114
Id. § 2(3)(C). Indeed, Congress encouraged the implementation of tribal law,
particularly in the probate arena, with the Indian Land Consolidation Act. See S. Rep.
No. 98-632, at 1 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5470, 5471.
115
American Indian Probate Reform Act § 2(3)(A)-(D), 118 Stat. at 1773–74.
Under the AIPRA, “trust or restricted lands” includes:
[L]ands, title to which is held by the United States in trust for an Indian tribe
or individual, or which is held by an Indian tribe or individual subject to a
restriction by the United States against alienation; and . . . “trust or restricted
interest in land” or “trust or restricted interest in a parcel of land” means an
interest in land, the title to which interest is held in trust by the United States
for an Indian tribe or individual, or which is held by an Indian tribe or
individual subject to a restriction by the United States against alienation.
25 U.S.C. § 2201(4)(i)–(ii).
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Land Consolidation Act.
116
In doing so they provided a basic
framework for general probate law that tribes could follow in
developing their own codes.
117
Through AIPRA, Congress brought
uniformity to the probate process “by giving one overarching law to
follow, instead of the amalgamation of state laws previously used
to determine the distribution of property.”
118
Under AIPRA, trust and restricted property can be
devised to the owner’s heirs through a will, or it can pass
according to either AIPRA’s intestacy provision or a tribe’s
probate code that has been approved by the BIA.
119
Probate heirs
may include the deceased’s spouse, children, relatives, or the
tribe that has jurisdiction over the trust or restricted property.
120
For the property to remain “in trust,” it must be devised to
a person who meets AIPRA’s definition of “Indian” or someone
who is within two degrees of consanguinity to an Indian as
defined by AIPRA.
121
AIPRA defines “Indian” more broadly than
other statutes by including any person who is—or is eligible to
become—a member of an Indian tribe
122
or who is an owner of a
trust or restricted interest in land as AIPRA’s enactment.
123
It also
includes anyone deemed “Indian” under the Indian
Reorganization Act
124
(IRA).
125
Eligible heirs take the property in
“the same trust or restricted status as such interest was held
immediately prior to the decedent’s death.”
126
116
See 25 U.S.C. § 2205.
117
See American Indian Probate Reform Act § 2(3)(A)–(D), 118 Stat. at 1773–74.
118
Franken, supra note 97, at 355–56.
119
25 U.S.C. § 2206.
120
Id.
121
Id. §§ 2201(9)(b), 2206(a)(2).
122
An “Indian tribe” is “any Indian tribe, band, group, pueblo, or community for
which, or for the members of which, the United States holds lands in trust.” Id. § 2201(1).
123
Id. § 2201(2). AIPRA was enacted on October 27, 2004. Id. Specifically,
under AIPRA, an “Indian” is:
(A) any person who is a member of any Indian tribe, is eligible to become a
member of any Indian tribe, or is an owner (as of October 27, 2004) of a trust
or restricted interest in land;
(B) any person meeting the definition of Indian under the Indian
Reorganization Act (25 U.S.C. 479) and the regulations promulgated
thereunder; and
(C) with respect to the inheritance and ownership of trust or restricted land in
the State of California pursuant to section 2206 of this title, any person
described in subparagraph (A) or (B) or any person who owns a trust or
restricted interest in a parcel of such land in that that State.
Id.
124
See Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 5101–129 (2012)).
125
See 25 U.S.C. § 2201(2)(B).
126
Id. § 2206(a)(5).
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However, there is no requirement that the property must
pass to an Indian or tribal member.
127
Rather, a testator may
devise the property to anyone through their will and the tribe’s
BIA-approved intestacy provision may designate non-Indians or
nontribal members as potential successors.
128
If trust property is
devised to a nontribal member, it will no longer be held in trust,
although the tribe will have the option to purchase the property
for fair market value.
129
If a trust owner dies intestate, and there is no tribal probate
code, the trust or restricted property will pass under AIPRA or an
approved tribal intestacy provision.
130
Under the AIPRA, the
property will pass to the deceased’s surviving immediate family
only “if they either a) meet the definition of ‘Indian,’ b) are the
decedent’s descendants within two generations of an Indian, or c)
they are already co-owners of the same parcel of land.”
131
Under AIPRA’s intestacy provision, the surviving spouse
receives one-third of the deceased spouse’s individual Indian
money (IIM) account
132
and a life estate in the trust- or restricted-
property if there are other surviving heirs.
133
If there are no other
heirs, the surviving spouse receives the entire IIM account
balance as well as a life estate in the trust- or restricted-land.
134
However, when the decedent’s interest in the trust property is less
than 5 percent, a surviving spouse retains a life estate in the trust
or restricted property if the spouse resides on the property.
135
The remaining interests are passed to the deceased’s
“single heir.”
136
Under the “single heir rule,” if there is no life
estate created for a surviving spouse who remains on the
property or if there is a remainder interest from the life estate,
the decedent’s interest descends first to their eldest child if the
child is an eligible heir.
137
If there is no eligible child heir, the
127
See id. § 2206.
128
Id. § 2206(b)(1)(A).
129
See id. § 2205(c)(1)(A).
130
See id. §§ 2205(a), 2206(a).
131
McCulley, supra note 84, at 413 (emphasis omitted).
132
25 U.S.C. § 2206(b)(3)(A) (“The term ‘trust personality’ as used in this section
includes all funds and securities of any kind which are held in trust in an individual Indian
money account or otherwise supervised by the Secretary.”).
133
Id. § 2206(a)(2)(A).
134
Id.
135
Id. § 2206(a)(2)(D).
136
Id.
137
Id. For purposes of section 2206, “eligible heirs” includes:
[A]ny of a decedent’s children, grandchildren, great grandchildren, full
siblings, half siblings by blood, and parents who are—
(A) Indian; or
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interest descends to the eldest eligible grandchild or the eldest
eligible great-grandchild.
138
If the deceased left no eligible
descendants, the remaining interest reverts to the tribe.
139
If
there is no tribe to inherit the property, the interest is “divided
equally among co-owners of trust or restricted interests in the
parcel.”
140
Finally, if there are no co-owners, the property reverts
to the United States to be sold.
141
AIPRA’s restriction of intestacy heirs to those who are
Indian, within two degrees of Indian heritage, or already co-
owners may conflict with tribal custom or law.
142
For instance, a
surviving spouse who meets a particular tribe’s definition of
“Indian,” but does not meet AIPRA’s definition of “Indian” may be
divested of an interest she may have been entitled to under tribal
law.
143
However, because AIPRA defines Indian to include any
member of a tribe or holder of trust property, it is also possible
the opposite would happen in that the tribe might not consider
the person entitled to inherit, but the AIPRA would.
144
Further,
while AIPRA permits property to be devised to a non-Indian or to
pass via a tribal probate code, such a devise also gives rise to a
tribal right to purchase the property from the surviving non-
Indian heir.
145
This provision may effectively deny a devisee the
ability to pass her property to a surviving non-Indian spouse. This
issue is particularly problematic when either resources or
religious beliefs preclude the drafting of wills.
146
AIPRA also permits tribal governments to adopt probate
codes to govern the disposition of trust or restricted property
that is located on the tribe’s reservation or otherwise subject to
tribal jurisdiction.
147
Such codes may include rules of intestate
succession and other rules “that are consistent with Federal law
and that promote the policies set forth in section 102 of the
(B) lineal descendants within [two] degrees of consanguinity of an Indian;
or
(C) owners of a trust or restricted interest in a parcel of land for purposes
of inheriting by descent, renunciation, or consolidation agreement under
section 2206 of this title, another trust or restricted interest in such parcel
from the decedent[.]
Id. § 2201(9).
138
Id. § 2206(a)(2)(D).
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
SeeMcCulley, supra note 84, at 417.
143
Id.
144
See id. at 414, 416–17.
145
25 U.S.C. §§ 2205(c)(1)(A), 2206(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A)(ii).
146
SeeMcCulley, supra note 84, at 418.
147
25 U.S.C. § 2205(a)(1).
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Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000.”
148
Tribal
probate codes are, however, subject to the approval of the BIA.
149
It is an open question whether a tribal probate code can deny a
surviving same-sex spouse an intestacy share while remaining
“consistent with Federal law,” which, under Windsor, requires
federal recognition of same-sex marriage.
150
Generally, approval will not be granted to a code that
prohibits the succession to a lineal descendent of the original
Indian allottee or to someone who is not a member of the tribe
that holds jurisdiction over that interest.
151
To include such
restrictions, the tribal code must also allow for eligible devisees
to renounce their interests, for spouses or lineal descendants to
reserve a life estate, and for the payment of fair market value.
152
As of 2015, the BIA has approved three tribal probate codes—
those belonging to the Fond du Lac Band, the Northern
Cheyenne Tribe in Montana, and the Confederated Tribes of the
Umatilla Indian Reservation in Oregon.
153
Consequently, AIPRA
governs the vast majority of trust and restricted property.
On its face, AIPRA does not provide a definition of “spouse”
nor does it appear to prohibit a surviving same-sex spouse from
inheriting under its provisions.
154
Indeed, until DOMA there was
no federal definition of marriage.
155
Nor was it defined within the
context of probate. However, the definition does not appear to
depend upon the tribal definition as it does not recognize
customary marriages that a tribe might.
156
Thus, during the
pendency of DOMA, its definition would have likely prevailed in
the probate of Indian trust property and would have prevented a
spouse from inheriting trust property, even if married by a tribal
148
Id. § 2205(a)(2).
149
Id. § 2205(b)(1).
150
Id. § 2205(a)(2); see United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 769–70 (2013)
(citing U.S. CONST. amend. V).
151
25 U.S.C. § 2205 (a)(3).
152
Id.
153
Press Release, Indian Affairs, Dep’t of the Interior, Assistant Secretary
Washburn Announces Approval of Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa’s
Probate Code (Aug. 4, 2015), https://www.bia.gov/as-ia/opa/online-press-release/assista
nt-secretary-washburn-announces-approval-fond-du-lac-band-lake
[https://perma.cc/UAJ6-TVA8].
154
GUSS, supra note 12, at 18–19; see 25 U.S.C. § 2206. It is an open question
whether a tribal probate code could deny a surviving same-sex spouse an intestacy share
while remaining “consistent with Federal law,” which, under Windsor, requires federal
recognition of same-sex marriage. 25 U.S.C. § 2205(a)(2); see Windsor, 570 U.S. at 769–
70. Presently, only three tribes have had probate codes accepted by BIA for disposition
of trust/restricted property, so this question is unlikely to be addressed any time soon.
See Press Release, supra note 153.
155
See Tweedy, supra note 4, at 132–33.
156
GUSS, supra note 12, at 18–19.
490 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:2
government that recognized same-sex marriage.
157
However, since
Windsor required federal recognition of lawfully-conducted same-
sex marriages,Windsor’s definition of marriage should now be the
operative one for the purposes of probating property subject to
AIPRA.
158
Similarly,Obergefellwould appear to require that states
include same-sex spouses in their intestacy distributions for
surviving spouses. As the Court explained, marriage includes
many state-recognized material benefits including rules of
intestate succession.
159
Excluding same-sex couples from marriage
deprives them of the benefits that derive from marriage, causing
their relationships to suffer an instability opposite-sex couples
would find intolerable.
160
B. Personal & Nontrust Property
In addition to trust property governed by AIPRA,
161
a
couple’s marital property may include personal property (such
as bank accounts, motor vehicles, or jewelry) and nontrust real
property. Disposition of this property will be governed either by
tribal or by state law depending upon the deceased’s domicile
and the location of the property.
162
If a tribal member dies while domiciled on tribal land,
then, assuming the tribe has a probate code, that code would
determine who inherits any nontrust property located within the
reservation.
163
Property outside the tribe’s land would be subject
157
Bushyhead, supra note 66, at 542–43 (“[T]he AIPRA may find its way into
the analysis of same-sex couple spousal rights when other tribes, whose members own
‘trust and restricted lands,’ pass laws allowing same-sex marriage. In these cases, the
AIPRA, as an Act of Congress, discriminates against same-sex spouses by employing the
federal definition of spouse for intestate succession.” (footnotes omitted)).
158
Nor is it likely that a tribe’s definition would control given AIPRA’s rejection of
customary marriages that are recognized by tribes. See GUSS, supra note 12, at 18. The
Uniform Law Commission is currently drafting a Uniform Tribal Probate Code, in the hopes
that it will merge the gaps between state probate codes andAIPRA.SeeMODELTRIBALPROB.
CODE § 3-504 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, Committee Meeting Draft 2019), https://www.uniform
laws.org/viewdocument/march-2019-committee-meeting-draf-3?CommunityKey=8a2f2343-
6723-41e9-a4cf-d824ef951ed9&tab=librarydocuments [https://perma.cc/W8QL-9KGD]. The
current draft defers to tribes to “determine[ ] spousal status based upon Tribal Nation law or
custom, and determine[ ] the extent to which abuse, abandonment, or other similar conduct
disqualifies a spouse from succeeding to a property interest.” Id. It is uncertain whether such
a provision would actually permit states or the federal government to ignore same-sex
marriages given the dictates ofWindsor andObergefell.
159
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015).
160
Id.
161
See 25 U.S.C. § 2206.
162
GUSS, supra note 12, at 18–19. Rather than address all fifty states where a
tribal member’s property may be located, this article will only discuss those states that
encompass the Navajo Nation—i.e., Arizona, NewMexico, and Utah. However, any state
would be equally bound by Obergefell.
163
If the tribe does not have a probate code, the state court would determine
who inherits. Id.
2020] FRAYING THE KNOT 491
to the state probate code where that property is located.
164
If a
tribal member dies while domiciled outside Indian Country, then
the law of the state of domicile would control disposition of
property located within that state and tribal law would determine
who inherits any property on tribal land.
165
For instance, the estates of the more than three hundred
thousandmembers of the Navajo Nation
166
could be affected by five
different sets of probate codes. In addition to AIPRA, the Navajo
Nation has its own probate code that governs the estates of tribal
members domiciled on the reservation and whose property is
within its jurisdiction.
167
Similarly, rights to marital property
acquired by Navajo while within the Navajo Nation’s jurisdiction
is governed by Navajo law.
168
Further, members’ estates may be
subject to the laws of any of the three states its reservation spans—
NewMexico, Utah, and Arizona.
169
1. Navajo Nation
Under Navajo probate code, property acquired during the
course of the marriage is deemed community property.
170
When
one spouse dies, one-half of the community property passes to the
surviving spouse.
171
Community property is not part of the
probate estate and is not devisable by will.
172
The remaining half
of the nonrestricted community property, as well as any separate
property,
173
passes by will, or absent a will, according to the tribe’s
intestacy provision.
174
Under that provision, the decedent’s father,
mother, brothers, and sisters are each entitled to one personal
164
Id. at 19.
165
Id.
166
See NAVAJO DIV. OF HEALTH & NAVAJO EPIDEMIOLOGY CTR., NAVAJO
POPULATION PROFILE: 2010 U.S. CENSUS, at 5 (Dec. 2013), https://www.nec.navajo-nsn.gov/
Portals/0/Reports/NN2010PopulationProfile.pdf [https://perma.cc/PYS5-VR8M].
167
See NAVAJO R. PROBATE P., http://www.navajocourts.org/Rules/probatepro.
htm [https://perma.cc/UU5J-EA36].
168
NAVAJONATIONCODEANN. tit. 9, § 212 (“Marital rights in property acquired
in Navajo Indian Country during marriage by Navajo Indians shall be controlled by the
laws of the Navajo Nation.”).
169
See Official Site of the Navajo Nation, supra note 77.
170
Community property includes all goods, money, livestock, grazing permits,
and other real and personal property. NAVAJO R. PROBATE P. 5.
171
Id.Any property acquired by either spouse during the marriage is community
property. NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 9, §§ 205–09. Only the man, however, can
unilaterally dispose of community property. NAVAJONATIONCODEANN. tit. 9, §§ 205–09.
172
NAVAJO R. PROBATE P. 5.
173
Property acquired by either husband or wife prior to marriage is the
separate property of whomever acquired it, without regard to membership or enrollment
status in Navajo Nation. NAVAJONATION CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 202.
174
NAVAJO R. PROBATE P. 6.
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item as selected by the family.
175
If the deceased has a surviving
spouse and issue,
176
distribution of the remaining property
depends on whether the property is on Navajo land in Arizona or
NewMexico.
177
The code does not contain any special provision for
property in Utah.
178
For those tribal members residing on reservation land
within Arizona, if all the surviving children are those of both the
deceased and the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse is
entitled to the entire remaining share.
179
If, however, the
surviving spouse is not the parent of one or more of the
deceased’s surviving children, then the surviving spouse takes
one-half of the deceased’s separate property and the surviving
children receive the rest of the deceased’s separate property and
the remaining half of the community property.
180
In New Mexico, the surviving spouse receives the
deceased’s community property as well as one-quarter of the
separate property, regardless of any surviving issue or the
issue’s parentage.
181
Any surviving issue receives the remaining
three-quarters of the separate property.
182
If, however, there is
no surviving issue, the surviving spouse receives the entirety of
the decedent’s property.
183
If the decedent leaves no surviving
relatives as identified by the code, the estate passes to the closest
surviving relative of the surviving spouse.
184
Under Navajo law, “[m]arital rights in property acquired
in Navajo Indian Country during marriage by Navajo Indians
shall be controlled by the laws of the Navajo Nation.”
185
When
paired with the tribe’s DOMA, this provision would preclude
same-sex Navajo couples from having their marital property
rights recognized by their tribal government.
186
Finally, the Navajo Probate Code provides that Navajo
custom regarding property distribution overrides the code
175
Id. 6(2). These provisions apply after the decedent’s final costs and outstanding
debts have been paid. Further, if the deceased was amedicine man, his official paraphernalia
is to be given to a medicine man of the family’s choosing. Id. 6(1).
176
“Issue” includes children, grandchildren, and great grandchildren. Id. 6(3).
177
See id. 6(3)(a)–(c). The code does not mention property located in Utah.
178
See id.
179
Id. 6(3)(a); see In re Bigthumb, 6 Navajo Rptr. 453, 455–45 (Navajo D. Ct. 1989).
180
NAVAJO R. PROBATE P. 6(3)(b).
181
Id. 6(3)(c); see Benally v. Denetclaw, 5 Navajo Rptr. 174, 177 (Navajo 1987).
182
NAVAJO R. PROBATE P. 6(3)(c).
183
Id. 6(5).
184
Id. 6(9).
185
NAVAJONATION CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 212.
186
Compare NAVAJONATIONCODE ANN. tit. 9, § 1 (noting marriages performed
outside Nation are recognized if valid in the jurisdiction where performed unless
specifically “void and prohibited by Section 2 of this title”), and § 2(C) (prohibiting same-
sex marriage), with NAVAJO R. PROBATE P. 6 (specifying order of intestacy succession).
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itself.
187
According to the code, “[i]f there is shown to be a Navajo
custom concerning the distribution of the property, the property
will descend according to that custom, even if the custom is in
conflict with any other provision of this rule.”
188
For those tribal members who are domiciled off the
reservation, their nontrust and personal property would be
governed by the law of the state of domicile.
189
Tribal members
domiciled on the reservation could still be subject to state probate
law if they own property, such as bank accounts, that are located
outside the reservation and within that state’s jurisdiction.
190
While those assets may be located in any of the fifty states, this
article discusses the probate rules in effect for the three states
that encompass the Navajo reservation—Arizona, New Mexico,
and Utah.
2. Arizona
Under Arizona’s intestacy statute, the entirety of the
decedent’s half of the couple’s community property as well as her
separate property passes to the surviving spouse if there are no
surviving issue
191
or if all surviving issue are also those of the
surviving spouse.
192
If any surviving issue is not also those of the
surviving spouse, then the surviving spouse receives one-half of
the decedent’s separate property, but none of the decedent’s
share of the couple’s community property.
193
3. New Mexico
In New Mexico, the decedent’s one-half share of the
couple’s community property passes to the surviving spouse.
194
As
for separate property, when the decedent dies without issue,
195
the
187
See In re Estate of Kindle, 6 Am. Tribal Law 750, 755 (Navajo 2006) (finding
lower court did not err by applying custom rather than state intestacy statute because
tribal Probate Code provision requiring application of state probate law if “custom” was
unproven was inconsistent with tribe’s Fundamental Law requiring application of custom).
188
NAVAJO R. PROBATE P. 6(10).
189
GUSS, supra note 12, at 19.
190
Id. at 18–19.
191
Arizona defines issue to mean “descendent,” which includes “all of the
decedent’s descendants of all generations, with the relationship of parent and child at each
generation.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-1201(13), (34).
192
Id. § 14-2102.
193
Id.
194
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-102.
195
New Mexico defines “issue” to mean “descendent[ ],” which is defined to
include “all of the individual’s descendants of all generations, with the relationship of
parent and child at each generation being determined by the definition of child and
parent contained in the Uniform Probate Code.” Id. § 45-1-201(27), (9).
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surviving spouse receives the entirety of the decedent’s separate
property.
196
If there is a surviving issue, the surviving spouse
receives one-fourth of the decedent’s separate property.
197
4. Utah
Utah’s probate code provides that the surviving spouse
receives the decedent’s entire estate if there are no surviving
descendants or if all the surviving descendants are also those of the
surviving spouse.
198
If any of the surviving descendants are not
those of the surviving spouse, the spouse receives the first $75,000
and one-half of the decedent’s estate.
199
When the surviving spouse
will share the estate with others, Utah reduces the surviving
spouse’s share by the value of any nonprobated transfers.
200
Nonprobated transfers are counted as an “advancement,” and
include property that automatically transfers to the surviving
spouse upon death.
201
If the advancement totals more than the
spouse’s share under the probate code the surviving spouse
receives nothing more from the decedent’s estate.
202
III. PROBATE&NONRECOGNITION OF SAME-SEXMARRIAGE
I grew up traditional, my grandparents taught me about
love, they taught me about respect, as well as the sacredness of
having a family. So . . . let’s say that my partner and I decide to
get married in California, or let’s say we go to Albuquerque . . . the
state recognizes it, and so I can come back here home . . . and the
Navajo government will not recognize the rights and the benefits I
deserve. They will not recognize the rights and the benefits my
partner deserves.
~ Diné marriage equality activist Alray Nelson
203
Imagine a tribal member who dies intestate while
domiciled on reservation lands within the state of Arizona. She
is a citizen of the United States, the Navajo Nation, and Arizona.
She holds trust property in her name, has personal property in
196
Id. § 45-2-102.
197
Id.
198
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-102.
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
Id. §§ 75-2-102, -206.
202
See id. § 75-2-102.
203
Tell Me More Staff, States May Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, but Navajo
Nation Won’t, NPR: CODE SWITCH (Jan. 9, 2014, 1:46 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/
codeswitch/2014/01/09/261048308/states-may-recognize-same-sex-marriages-but-navajo
-nation-wont [https://perma.cc/K72W-ABAQ].
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her home on the reservation, and a parcel of real estate outside
the reservation within the confines of Arizona. She and her wife
have raised and provided for three teenaged children, who are
biologically the surviving spouse’s offspring. Ideally, the couple
would protect their assets with a will, thus avoiding intestacy
proceedings altogether. Like most Americans, however, Indians
are likely to die intestate.
204
As a consequence of overlapping probate jurisdictions, our
tribal member’s estate would be subject to three different
intestacy proceedings—one by the BIA, one by the state of
Arizona, and one pursuant to the laws of the Navajo Nation.
205
In
the first two jurisdictions, her surviving spouse would receive her
full share under the applicable intestacy provision.
206
But under
the third, her spouse would be completely denied her intestate
share of property accumulated during the life of her marriage.
207
Because the determination of succession for the tribal portion of
her estate would be dependent not only upon the domicile of the
deceased and the location of the property, but upon the sexual
orientation of the married individuals, the surviving spouse of a
tribal member could have rights to marital property denied
because of the sex of her spouse.
208
While differences between intestacy proceeds are likely in
a divided system,
209
both the domicile and location of nontrust
property are within the control of the tribal member. Sexual
orientation—who one loves—is not. Nevertheless, the surviving
spouse may lose her share of assets accumulated over the life of
the marriage simply because of her sex. This circumstance leaves
the couple with two choices
210
—remain on the reservation and
risk a surviving spouse losing property accumulated with her
spouse over the course of the marriage or leave what is possibly
the only place they have ever called home to save their estate. The
latter choice can be devastating for tribal members, who can lose
their cultural and social community and their ability to
participate in tribal life. Further their children will then grow up
204
See sources cited supra note 11.
205
See discussion supra Part II.
206
See discussion supra Sections II.A, II.B.2.
207
See discussion supra Section II.B.1.
208
See discussion supra Section II.B.1.
209
See Joseph William Singer, Property Law Conflicts, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 129,
130 (2014) (describing differential disposition of property resulting from jurisdictional
differences in allocation of estate assets).
210
Of course, there is a third choice—drafting a will designating the disposition
of assets. However, as already noted, most people in the United States die without a will.
SeeWeisbord, supra note 11, at 878. This reality is one reason intestacy provisions exist
at all. Denying someone property on the theory that they could have created a will
increases a burden on a same-sex couple that is not there for opposite sex couples.
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disconnected from their native heritage. For the tribe, the loss of
its members risks a permanent loss to its community as members
flee, often with their children, who may then never return.
211
In the hypothetical above, if the couple were to remain
within the reservation, it could be that their most essential
property—their personal belongings, such as photo albums,
souvenirs, wedding gifts—may be lost. That property would be
dispersed pursuant to a tribal probate code that does not
recognize their marriage. For the same reason, the couple’s
financial assets may pass to another relative, depriving the
surviving spouse of assets necessary to support the couple’s
children. This is especially true if the children are not the
biological kin of the deceased spouse. To avoid this possibility,
members would be wise to remove their nontrust assets from the
reservation simply to ensure the bulk of their assets is ultimately
conveyed to their surviving spouse.
While individual Indian families may protect their own
assets, community-wide changes resulting in more predictability
and stability would require more fundamental challenges to
existing tribal DOMAs. For instance, the Dineғ Marriage Act’s
prohibition against same-sexmarriages can only be undone by the
Navajo Nation’s Council or a tribal court.
212
That, however, does
not necessarily mean that lawful same-sex marriages performed
outside the tribe should not be given full effect, at least for
purposes of intestacy rights, within a tribe’s jurisdiction. Instead,
a tribe might consider that there are perhaps “fundamental
difference[s] between creating a marriage and recognizing a
marriage” that was lawfully performed in another jurisdiction.
213
Tribes could protect marital assets by recognizing marriages
performed in other jurisdictions, even while refusing to perform
such marriages. In short, tribes such as the Navajo that prohibit
same-sex marriage may, nonetheless, be convinced to recognize
211
See Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne, One Step Forward, Two Giant Steps Back:
How the “Existing Indian Family” Exception (Re)Imposes Anglo American Legal Values
on Indian Tribes to the Detriment of Cultural Autonomy, 33 AM. INDIANL. REV. 329, 358–
60 (2009) (discussing Congressional testimony and findings regarding importance of
Indian children and families to stability of Indian communities).
212
See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60–72 (1978) (finding tribes
not bound by federal courts’ interpretation of due process or equal protection); Talton v.
Mayes, 163U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (recognizing tribes’ sovereign right to determine and regulate
internal affairs); COHEN’SHANDBOOK, supra note 41, § 4.01(A)(1) (noting tribal powers of self-
government); see also Zug, supra note 4, at 772–73.
213
Rebecca Aviel, Faithful Unions, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 721, 736 (2018) (quoting
Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556)).
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suchmarriages from other jurisdictions to ease the administration
of an estate in probate.
214
In addition to romantic ideals of love and family devotion,
marriage as an institution invests married spouses with certain
obligations and duties to care and provide for each other and for
any minor children. As Justice Kennedy explained in Obergefell,
along with a married couple’s vows, society also supports the
couple both through formal recognition of their relationship and
through a series of material benefits designed to encourage and
nurture marriage itself.
215
These material benefits have generally
included an ever-expanding list of government rights and
benefits, including property rights embodied in rules of intestate
succession.
216
By conferring this panoply of rights, “[s]tates have
contributed to the fundamental character of the marriage right by
placing that institution at the center of so many facets of the legal
and social order.”
217
Finding no reason to differentiate between
same-sex and opposite-sex marriages on this point, Justice
Kennedy concluded that denying these rights to same-sex couples
materially burdens same-sex couples.
218
In effect, it deprives them
of the community support for their marriage, but more to the
point of this article, it deprives them of the spousal support
intestacy provisions provide to opposite-sex couples.
219
Indeed, marriage can be viewed as “a distributive
mechanism for ‘social goods of an immense variety of kinds:
material resources like money, jobs, nutrition; symbolic resources
like prestige and degradation; psychic resources like affectional
ties, erotic attraction and repulsion.’”
220
A government’s interest in
protecting marriage—and the distribution of marital assets—is
attributed, at least in part, to a desire to “privatize[ ] dependency,”
such that spouses are incentivized “to privately address the
dependencies that often arise when adults care for children and for
one another.”
221
While more modern notions of romance and
compatibility are often viewed as the most compelling reasons for
marriage, privatized dependency remains a central component of
214
See Jones, supra note 55, at 689 (“Many tribes have enacted legislation which
requires their court systems to recognize state court judgments, especially in the area of
domestic relations.”).
215
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015).
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
Id. at 2601–02.
219
See id.
220
Aviel, supra note 213, at 760 (quoting Janet Halley, What Is Family Law: A
Genealogy Part I, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 5–6 (2011)).
221
Id. at 761 (quoting Laura A. Rosenbury, Federal Visions of Private Family
Support, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1835, 1866–67 (2014)).
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its legal recognition.
222
As a consequence of this recognition and the
benefits bestowed by marriage, families act as “private welfare,”
lessening the need for overt government assistance.
223
However, for marriage to serve this private welfare
function, marriage must be stable. Stability is what gives
credence to the state’s preference for marriage over other
intimate relationships, just as that stability justifies the special
state-sanctioned benefits on the basis of the couple’s lifelong
commitment to mutually support each other. In short, the
assumption is that, in exchange for ensuring a stable foundation
for marriage, society can reasonably expect that a couple’s
“exclusive and enduring” commitment to each other will ensure
they, rather than the state, will support each other.
224
It is this expectation that creates the foundation upon
which a “system of privatized dependence” is built.
225
Within that
system, couples pool their resources and share their labor to
support a “family enterprise” instead of individual ventures.
226
While much of the social pressure deriving from marriage is
focused on shaping the behavior of the spouses, government
behavior also has a role.
227
For instance, states’ willingness to
recognize lawful marriages from other jurisdictions provides
stability that a marriage will endure regardless of locale.
228
In
doing so, states foster expectations of permanence, which are
essential for a marriage to endure.
229
Maintaining the expectations of stability and permanence
are equally important when considering how best to dispose of a
deceased spouse’s assets. When one spouse dies, the assets the
couple built together should continue to support the family.
Indeed, by giving priority to surviving spouses and children,
intestacy provisions
230
make clear that at least one goal of probate
is to ensure family support after the death of a family member.
222
See id.
223
Id. (quoting Halley, supra note 220, at 1866–67).
224
Id. at 762.
225
Id.
226
Id.
227
Id.
228
Id.
229
Id.
230
Generally, intestate provisions give priority to a surviving spouse over other
descendants or heirs. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 2206 (a)(2)(A)(i) (providing surviving spouse
receives one-third of deceased spouse’s IIM account); NAVAJOR. PROBATEP. 5 (allocating
half of marital property to surviving spouse); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2101 (providing
that deceased’s community and separate property pass to his surviving spouse); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 45-2-102 (providing that half of decedent’s community property passes to
the surviving spouse); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-102 (designating that surviving spouse
receives deceased’s entire estate when there are no other surviving descendants or if all
the surviving descendants are also those of the surviving spouse).
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For instance, the Navajo Nation’s probate deems all of a couple’s
property acquired during the marriage community property that
must pass to the surviving spouse.
231
It is not part of the probate
estate and may not be devised by will.
232
Tribal DOMAs interfere with the support-system that
marriage is, at least in part, designed to foster by refusing to
recognize the marriage that creates the priority of intestacy
succession. In short, the refusal to recognize same-sex marriages
means that marital assets necessary to support the family may be
lost, undermining marital stability at least for same-sex couples.
This result may be exactly what advocates against same-sex
marriage desire. Nevertheless, given that states and the federal
government recognize same-sex marriage and that the division of
probate assets is already needlessly complex, it seems far more
practical to follow one scheme at least when it comes to protecting
marital assets. Granted, uniformity could be established by either
rejecting or embracing same-sex marriage. However, because
Windsor and Obergefell mandate federal and state recognition of
marriage, tribal governments should consider recognizing same-
sexmarriages for the limited purpose of probating estates of those
who die intestate.
Thus, a couple who is legally married in the state of
Arizona—and whose marriage is recognized by that and every
other state and the federal government—will then begin to
function with the expectations and responsibilities of marriage.
While a government may wish to deem certain marriages
ineligible for state sanction, once the couple has married, it
would seem there is no reason to refuse recognition other than
to communicate moral disapproval.
233
However, by the time
recognition becomes an issue—at the death of a same-sex
spouse—the couple will have lived with the same expectations
and responsibilities of other legally married couples. They will
have accumulated assets, taken on parental responsibilities, and
assumed responsibility for each other’s well-being. “Faced with
an existing marriage from another state, a state is simply not in
the position to achieve the objectives it seeks to pursue when
deciding whether to initiate a marriage in the first place.”
234
It is
not preventing a marriage it believes unwise or contrary to its
view; it is simply punishing a couple by depriving it of marital
assets the couple’s work accumulated. An interest in expressing
231
NAVAJO R. PROBATE P. 5.
232
Id.
233
Aviel, supra note 213, at 762–63.
234
Id. at 762.
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moral disapproval “should rank beneath . . . the perpetual
reinforcement of the permanence norms that are essential to the
entire regime.”
235
As Justice Sotomayor explained, “states had
typically not determined that any deviation from their own
‘prerequisites’ for marriage constituted a violation of
public policy.”
236
Of course, it can be argued that it is not reasonable for
any Indian couple to live with an expectation that their marriage
will be recognized when they reside on a reservation that has
expressly rejected same-sex marriage. However, like Edith
Windsor and Thea Spyer, same-sex couples residing on the
reservation would live as married for the purpose of state and
federal law, but would be viewed as unmarried only for the
purpose of Navajo law.
237
Tribal DOMAs “divest[ ] married same-
sex couples of the duties and responsibilities that are an
essential part of married life and that they in most cases would
be honored to accept were DOMA not in force.”
238
Just as in
Windsor, the stability and predictability of these important
personal relations are diminished by a refusal to recognize the
couples’ marriages.
239
IV. PATHS TOWARDS RECOGNITION
Two mechanisms by which tribes could recognize same-
sex marriage would be under the Full Faith and Credit Clause
or by applying the principle of comity. While federal DOMA
prohibits requiring tribes to grant full faith and credit,
240
it does
not by its terms preclude tribal recognition of marriage. As
sovereigns, tribes are free to incorporate either notion into their
law to recognize lawful marriages performed by other tribal or
state governments.
A. Full Faith & Credit
Full faith and credit is typically understood as a
constitutional doctrine that applies between the federal
235
Id. at 763.
236
Id. at 736 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 213, at 32).
237
Cf. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 771 (2013).
238
Id. at 773. Of course,Windsorwas a challenge to federal recognition of marriage
and thus, did nothing to require tribal recognition of same-sex marriages performed in
jurisdictions permitting suchunions.Nevertheless,many of the reasons to recognizemarriage
apply equally to Indian couples and to tribal governments.
239
Cf. id.
240
28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
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government and the states.
241
It is the federal Constitution that
requires “[f]ull faith and credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the
Manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof.”
242
On its face, the Full Faith and
Credit Clause does not apply to tribal governments as its text
refers only to “State[s]”
243
and tribes are not deemed states under
any federal or state law.
244
While the Clause’s implementing
legislation, the Full Faith and Credit Act, extended the
obligations to courts within U.S. “[t]erritories,”
245
that act was
enacted in 1790, “before any tribal courts of record existed.”
246
The
Supreme Court has yet to address whether tribes are territories
within constitutional full faith and credit,
247
although it has at
times found tribes to be “territories”
248
and at other times not.
249
Lower federal courts and state courts have reached varied
conclusions on the question whether tribes are “territories” within
the meaning of the Full Faith and Credit Act.
250
241
See Robert N. Clinton, Comity & Colonialism: The Federal Courts’
Frustration of Tribal←→Federal Cooperation, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 42 (2004) [hereinafter
Comity & Colonialism].
242
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
243
Id.; seeWilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1997).
244
Steven J. Gunn, Compacts, Confederacies, and Comity: Intertribal
Enforcement of Tribal Court Orders, 34 N.M. L. REV. 297, 300 (2004).
245
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (“Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies
thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within
the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the
courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.”).
246
Comity & Colonialism, supra note 241, at 42.
247
Wilson, 127 F.3d at 808.
248
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. 100, 103–04, (1855)
(finding Cherokee Nation “a territory” within the meaning of a federal letters of
administration statute); see also Standley v. Roberts, 59 F. 836, 845 (8th Cir. 1894); Cornells
v. Shannon, 63 F. 305, 306 (8th Cir. 1894); Mehlin v. Ice, 56 F. 12, 19 (8th Cir. 1893).
249
See, e.g., Ex parte Morgan, 20 F. 298, 305 (W.D. Ark. 1883) (concluding
Cherokee Nation was not a “territory” within meaning of federal extradition statute).
250
Gunn, supra note 244, at 301–03 (stating some courts have concluded that
tribes’ status as sovereign nations rather than states exempted them from full faith and
credit). For instance, courts rejecting full faith and credit have employed various rationales
for so doing. See, e.g., Wilson, 127 F.3d at 809 (holding that neither Full Faith and Credit
Clause nor section 1738 applies to tribal judgments); see also Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc.,
571 P.2d 689, 694 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (concluding Navajo reservation is not a “territory”
within text of Full Faith and Credit Act); see also In re Red Fox v. Red Fox, 542 P.2d 918,
920 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) (concluding that quasi-sovereign nature of tribes meant tribal court
judgments were entitled to comity, but not full faith and credit); cf. John v. Baker, 982 P.2d
738, 762 (Alaska 1999) (noting that “federal legislation implementing the Constitution’s
Full Faith and Credit Clause has extended its application only to United States territories
and possessions”). In contrast, other courts have applied full faith and credit after
concluding tribes were “territories.” See, e.g.,Mehlin, 56 F. at 19 (applying earlier full faith
and credit statute and concluding “proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Cherokee
Nation in cases within their jurisdiction are on the same footing with proceedings and
judgments of the courts of the territories of the Union, and are entitled to the same faith
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For their part, tribal courts have largely rejected the
inclusion of tribes in the definition of “territories.”
251
For instance,
the Navajo Nation Court of Appeals has concluded that full faith
and credit does not govern the relationship between tribes and
states or between tribes themselves.
252
According to that court,
“[t]he practice of according full faith and credit to foreign orders
is inconsistent with the Navajo Nation’s conception of its own
sovereignty and that of other tribes, which sovereignty
contemplates ‘the exclusive jurisdiction of each Indian court over
certain matters.’”
253
and credit”); see also Tracy v. Superior Court of Maricopa Cty., 810 P.2d 1030, 1040 (Ariz.
1991) (“A majority of courts has deemed Indian tribes to be territories for purposes of the
federal statute extending the application of the full faith and credit clause to the territories
and possessions of the United States, 28 U.S.C. 1738.”); Standley, 59 F. at 845 (“[T]his court
has held that the judgments of the courts of these nations, in cases within their jurisdiction,
stand on the same footing with those of the courts of the territories of the Union and are
entitled to the same faith and credit.”); Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895 (Idaho 1982)
(deeming tribes’ territories under Full Faith and Credit Act), overruled by Coeur d’Alene
Tribe v. Johnson, 405 P.3d 13 (Idaho 2014); Halwood v. Cowboy Auto Sales, Inc., 946 P.2d
1088, 1090 (N.M. 1997); Jim v. CIT Fin. Servs. Corp., 533 P.2d 751, 752 (N.M. 1975)
(recognizing that NewMexico courtsmust grant full faith and credit to laws of Navajo Tribe
because tribe is “a territory” within meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1738); Chischilly v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 629 P.2d 340, 344 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980), rev’d, 629 P.2d 340 (N.M.
1981) (finding Navajo Code prohibition against self-help repossessions entitled to full faith
and credit under Full Faith and Credit Act); Gunn, supra note 244, at 301–03. Still others
have taken a third approach, making full faith and credit contingent on tribal reciprocity.
See Turner v. McGee, 681 F.3d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Oklahoma state courts grant
full faith and credit to tribal judgments only ‘where the tribal court that issued the
judgment grants reciprocity to judgments of the courts of the State of Oklahoma.’” (quoting
Barrett v. Barrett, 878 P.2d 1051, 1054 (Okla. 1994))).
251
Gunn, supra note 244, at 305–07.
252
Id. at 304. The three states that include Navajo territory have split in their
acceptance of full faith and credit. NewMexico has consistently applied full faith and credit
to recognize tribal court judgments and tribal laws in state court. See CIT Fin. Servs. Corp.,
533 P.2d at 752 (recognizing that NewMexico courts must grant full faith and credit to the
laws of Navajo Nation because the nation is a “territory” within meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738);Halwood, 946 P.2d at 1090, 1093 (enforcing Navajo Court’s imposition of damages
under full faith and credit because the tribe was a “territory” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1738);
Chischilly, 629 P.2d at 341–42, 344 (finding Navajo Code prohibition against self-help
repossessions entitled to full faith and credit under Full Faith and Credit Clause). Arizona,
on the other hand, has largely ignored full faith and credit, instead recognizing tribal court
judgments under the doctrine of comity. See In re Estate of Lynch, 377 P.2d 199, 200–01
(Ariz. 1962) (concluding that a will probated in Navajo Tribal Court of Indian Offenses
should be recognized under comity); Begay v. Miller, 222 P.2d 624, 628 (Ariz. 1950)
(ignoring the Full Faith and Credit Act and finding the Clause applied to states only); Leon
v. Numkena, 689 P.2d 566, 569–70 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (rejecting full faith and credit and
holding instead the divorce and custody decree was recognizable under comity); Babbitt
Ford, Inc., 571 P.2d at 694–95 (rejecting the argument that the Navajo Tribe constituted a
“territory” within meaning of the Full Faith and Credit Act). Similar to Arizona, Utah has
said “Indian tribes and nations are not states whose judgments are entitled per se to full
faith and credit.” Searle v. Searle, 38 P.3d 307, 314–15, 320 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) (finding,
nonetheless, tribal court custody determination valid and final, and thus, enforceable
pursuant to the Foreign Judgement Act and ICWA’s full faith and credit provision).
253
Gunn, supra note 244, at 304 (citations omitted). On the other hand, the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Court of Appeals found Indian tribes were covered by full
faith and credit provisions of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA). Id. at
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Furthermore, full faith and credit does not typically
apply to marriage.
254
Its inapplicability is somewhat confounding
given the Clause’s reference to “public [a]cts” and “[r]ecords.”
255
Just from the text alone, it could be easily assumed that a
marriage license—or the state sanctioning of a marriage
ceremony—would constitute a “public [a]ct.”
256
Or that the public
records of marriages maintained by a jurisdiction would fit the
plain meaning of “a [r]ecord.”
257
Nevertheless, full faith and
credit has generally not been the basis on which to recognize
cross-jurisdictional marriage by lower federal or state courts.
258
Instead, the Clause has typically been reserved for judicial
judgments rather thanmarriages, which “nomatter how intricate
the procedures used to formalize the union, simply cannot be
categorized as judgments.”
259
The distinction between judgments
and law with respect to full faith and credit means that states are
“otherwise free, for the most part, to apply their own choice of law
principles to any given dispute, with the result of choosing their
304–05 (citing Eberhard v. Eberhard, 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6059 (Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribal Ct. App. 1997)). Under the statute, states must enforce valid child custody
determinations reached by a sister state and no other state may exercise concurrent
jurisdiction once another state has reached a determination. See Thompson v. Thompson,
484 U.S. 174, 183, 187 (1988). “The purpose of the act was to remedy the inapplicability
of full faith and credit requirements to custody determinations and to deter parents from
kidnapping their children to relitigate custody in another state.” DeMent v. Oglala Sioux
Tribal Court, 874 F.2d 510, 513 n.3 (8th Cir. 1989).
254
Aviel, supra note 213, at 728–30.
255
U. S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see Aviel, supra note 213, at 728.
256
Aviel, supra note 213, at 728.
257
Id. Indeed, one assumption commentators made in the early fight for
marriage equality was that states would be obliged to recognize same-sex marriages
performed in other jurisdictions under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Id. Opponents
of same-sex marriage also appeared to believe the plain language of the Clause would
control. Id. at 735. Indeed, that Congress opted to include language in DOMA limiting
full faith and credit in the realm of same-sex marriage suggests Congress also viewed
the Clause as at least potentially applicable to marriage. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C
(providing that neither states, territories, nor Indian tribes may be required to recognize
same-sex marriages performed in other jurisdictions); Lynn D. Wardle, Non-Recognition
of Same-Sex Marriage Judgments Under DOMA and the Constitution, 38 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 365, 371 (2005) (discussing DOMA’s full faith and credit provisions); Tweedy, supra
note 4, at 133. Furthermore, during Obergefell oral argument, Justice Scalia assumed
that the act of marrying couples would constitute a “public act[ ].” Aviel, supra note 213,
at 735 (“Public acts? It would include the act of marrying people, I assume.” (quoting
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 213, at 27)). Nevertheless, despite the justices’
interest in the topic during oral arguments, the Court’s final opinion did not reach the
issue. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015). Instead, the Court
resolved the case on the basis of the Fourteenth Amendment, holding that “same-sex
couples may exercise [this] fundamental right to marry in all States.” Id. at 2607.
258
See, e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (finding
DOMA was valid exercise of congressional authority under Full Faith and Credit
Clause); see also Aviel, supra note 213, at 729. (“[T]here is not a single judicial decision
that holds that full faith and credit requires states to recognize marriages that violate
their own public policies concerning who may marry.” (citations omitted)).
259
Aviel, supra note 213, at 730.
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own state’s substantive law.”
260
This result is somewhat odd, as it
renders two of the three terms listed in the Clause superfluous.
261
One justification is avoiding “requiring a state to give effect to all
‘[a]cts’ of a sister state [that] would eviscerate its authority to
regulate in divergent ways.”
262
That is fine on its face, but
marriage raises special problems as couples do not always remain
within one jurisdiction throughout the life of the marriage.
Couples marry. They acquire property. They have children. They
may separate. They may divorce. They may move. And when one
dies, they leave behind a spouse and possibly children. If the
couple has changed residences during the marriage, the move
raises concerning questions of interstate recognition that affects
property and parental rights. Full faith and credit would provide
some basis of stability for married couples and their children. It
would also provide more predictability and security for marital
assets in the event one spouse dies intestate.
While full faith and credit has not been applied to
marriage or consistently to tribes, Congress has included full
faith provisions in laws affecting families, in particular to cover
child custody and support judgments and domestic violence
orders.
263
The inclusion of provisions in assorted legislation does
260
Id.
261
Id. at 724–26 (“It bears some emphasis in a constitutional culture such as ours,
where textualism still has such purchase, that this rewriting of the clause is particularly
heavy-handed, rendering null two of the enumerated items in a list of three.”).
262
Id. at 725.
263
See, e.g., Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (“The United States,
every State, every territory or possession of the United States, and every Indian tribe shall
give full faith and credit to the public to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings
of any Indian tribe applicable to Indian child custody proceedings to the same extent that
such entities give full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings
of any other entity.”); 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a) (including tribal courts protection orders as
entitled to acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any Indian tribe applicable to Indian
child custody proceedings full faith and credit); 25 U.S.C. § 2207 (requiring full faith and
credit for “any tribal actions taken pursuant to” tribal probate codes on descent and
distribution of trust or restricted lands); 25 U.S.C. § 3106(c) (“Tribal court judgments
regarding forest trespass shall be entitled to full faith and credit in Federal and State courts
to the same extent as a Federal court judgment obtained under this section.”); 25 U.S.C.
§ 3713(c) (“Tribal court judgments regarding agricultural trespass shall be entitled to full
faith and credit in Federal and State courts to the same extent as a Federal court judgment
obtained under this section.”); 28U.S.C. § 1738B (providing for full and credit to tribal court
child support orders and defining “State” to include “Indian country”); see also Kaltag
Tribal Council v. Jackson, 344 F. App’x 324 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding tribal court custody
determination entitled to full faith and credit under ICWA); Native Vill. of Venetie I.R.A.
Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 562 (9th Cir. 1991) (“If the native villages of Venetie and
Fort Yukon are sovereign entities which may exercise dominion over their members’
domestic relations, Alaska must give full faith and credit to any child-custody
determinations made by the villages’ governing bodies in accordance with the full faith and
credit clause of the Indian Child Welfare Act.”); Kinlichee v. United States, 929 F. Supp.
2d 951, 962 (D. Ariz. 2013) (finding Navajo court’s order validating Navajo father’s
posthumous adoption of Navajo daughter was entitled to full faith and credit).
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suggest, at least tacitly, that Congress may accept full faith and
credit as the appropriate model for state-tribal or inter-tribal
cooperation
264
and that full faith and credit may be required of
tribal governments.
265
Further, that Congress opted to include
language in DOMA limiting full faith and credit in the realm of
same-sex marriage suggests Congress also views the Clause as
at least potentially applicable to marriage.
266
Indeed, the purposes of full faith and credit would seem to
apply to tribal governments situated in a system of other
sovereigns. In incorporating a Full Faith and Credit Clause into
the Constitution, the framers sought to ensure interstate
cooperation and the integration necessary for a functional federal
system.
267
As the Supreme Court has explained, before the Clause,
“all the courts of the several Colonies and States were deemed
foreign to each other, and consequently judgments rendered by any
one of themwere considered as foreign judgments, and theirmerits
reexaminable in another Colony.”
268
Indeed, absent the Clause,
states would have had to enter into individual agreements between
each other, risking wasteful and confusing tangle of lawsuits
relitigating already-resolved matters.
269
Accordingly, the framers
included the Full Faith and Credit Clause as a mechanism to unify
the several states into an integrated federal system premised on
intergovernmental cooperation.
270
264
See Comity & Colonialism, supra note 241, at 24 (“[W]hen Congress has
directly considered the question, it has consistently chosen the Full Faith and Credit model
as a vehicle for mandating recognition . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
265
Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 841, 907 (1990) (“Congressional policy also suggests that full faith and credit, rather
than comity, forms the appropriate model for intergovernmental cooperation between
tribal governments and the remainder of the federal union.”) [hereinafter Tribal Courts].
266
It remains curious, however, that Congress included this provision in DOMA
if it viewed tribes as not bound by constitutional full faith and credit. See Tweedy, supra
note 4, at 133. It is even more curious given that interstate recognition of marriage has
not depended upon the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Id.
267
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 181 (1895).
268
Id.
269
Diana B. Garonzik, Full Reciprocity for Tribal Courts from a Federal Courts
Perspective: A Proposed Amendment to the Full Faith and Credit Act, 45 EMORY L.J. 723,
724 (1996).
270
See Gunn, supra note 244, at 300; see also Hilton, 159 U.S. at 181 (“[B]efore the
American Revolution, all the courts of the several Colonies and States were deemed foreign
to each other, and consequently judgments rendered by any one of them were considered as
foreign judgments, and their merits reëxaminable in another Colony, not only as to the
jurisdiction of the court which pronounced them, but also as to the merits of the controversy,
to the extent to which they were understood to be reëxaminable in England. . . . It was
because of that condition of the law, as between the American Colonies and States, that the
United States, at the very beginning of their existence as a nation, ordained that full faith
and credit should be given to the judgments of one of the States of the Union in the courts of
another of those States.”); Tribal Courts, supra note 265, at 897–98.
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A full faith and credit requirement was necessary, the
Court explained, because of the failure of the common law “to
impose any binding legal obligation to recognize and enforce the
judgments of another jurisdiction.”
271
Filling this void, full faith
and credit imposed a legal obligation on states, territories, and
possessions to recognize and enforce judgments from other
states, territories, or possessions.
272
Generally speaking, there is
no exception to this obligation. Thus, even when enforcement of
a particular judgment violates the enforcing jurisdiction’s public
policy, it is still required to enforce the judgment in compliance
with its full faith and credit obligations.
273
Although the purpose of the Clause was the integration of
state governments into a union, the underlying rationale—
intergovernmental cooperation and agreement—applies today to
tribal governments. Tribal governments are separate sovereigns
and entitled to self-determination. Because tribal citizens are also
state and federal citizens, however, tribal government decisions
are similarly bound to the legal fabric that stretches across
America. While it may be correct that the lack of tribal courts
meant the founders did not intend the Clause to apply to tribal
governments, today there are tribal courts of record. Tribal courts
are reaching decisions regarding the disposition of marital
property that affect not only tribal citizens, but the same people
who are also citizens of the United States and their respective
state governments. Surely marriage—and the potential for tribal
citizens to marry outside Indian Country while residing on a
reservation—would prompt concerns for more consistency
between state, federal, and tribal probate determinations.
Indeed, perhaps recognizing the need for inter-government
recognition and cooperation, tribal governments have occasionally
enacted their own full faith and credit requirements.
274
While some
federal statutes impose full faith and credit requirements, some
tribes accord full faith and credit to all valid orders by tribal or
other state governments.
275
Others, however, do so only with
respect to certain areas, “such as marriage, divorce, family
relations, and secured transactions.”
276
One downside to full faith and credit is that it is typically
viewed as mandatory and, consequently, considered an intrusion
into tribal sovereignty. Although such an intrusion is viewed
271
Comity & Colonialism, supra note 241, at 17.
272
Id. at 15.
273
Id. at 16.
274
See Gunn, supra note 244, at 313.
275
Id.
276
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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negatively by tribal governments, the rule’s rigidity does enhance
the stability of marriages by ensuring recognition rather than
leaving couples subject to ad hoc comity determinations.
Furthermore, a tribe’s choice to enact a full faith and credit
provision for marriage or for intestacy purposes would be an
exercise of tribal sovereignty, not a narrowing of it.
277
B. Comity
In contrast to full faith and credit, the doctrine of comity
has generally supported the enforcement of tribal court judgments
and cross-jurisdictional recognition of marriage. Unlike full faith
and credit, which originated in the need for federal integration of
states, comity rests on a jurisdiction’s voluntary recognition of and
respect for the legal acts of another jurisdiction.
278
Thus, a
jurisdiction is not obliged to enforce an extra-jurisdictional
decision, but can opt to do so if it chooses.
279
The Supreme Court
has recognized comity as an accommodation to foreign legal
decisions reached after a full and fair trial by a court of competent
jurisdiction with sufficient process to secure an impartial
administration of justice.
280
277
In contrast, were Congress to use its plenary power to impose the
requirement on tribes, that would rightfully be viewed as an intrusion on the tribe’s right
to self-governance. See Zug, supra note 4, at 772–73.
278
Comity & Colonialism, supra note 241, at 16; Tribal Courts, supra note 265,
at 905 (“While the comity doctrine reflects notions of international accommodation, the
Hilton case clearly points out that the doctrine represents a voluntary sovereign
accommodation, rather than a binding legal obligation judicially enforceable by a body
superior of the enforcing sovereign.”); see also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64
(1895) (“‘Comity,’ in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.”); Mexican v. Circle Bear, 370
N.W.2d 737, 742 (N.D. 1985) (Henderson, J., concurring) (“We must live in mutual
respect with our Indian brothers who serve on the trial courts of the various Indian
reservations in South Dakota. They, in return, should likewise extend unto our courts
reciprocating courtesy and respect.”).
279
Tribal Courts, supra note 265, at 905 (“[T]he Hilton case clearly points out
that the doctrine represents a voluntary sovereign accommodation, rather than a binding
legal obligation judicially enforceable by a body superior of the enforcing sovereign.”).
280
Hilton, 159 U.S. at 158. According to the Court,
[W]here there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a
court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings,
after due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a
system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice
between the citizens of its own country and those of other countries, and there
is nothing to show either prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under
which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other special
reason why the comity of this nation should not allow it full effect, the merits
of the case should not, in an action brought in this country upon the judgment,
be tried afresh, as on a new trial or an appeal, upon the mere assertion of the
party that the judgment was erroneous in law or in fact.
Id. at 202–03.
508 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:2
Despite its origins in international law, when determining
the enforceability of tribal court judgments, the majority of courts
have turned to comity.
281
This makes sense considering the
constitutional basis for full faith and credit that is absent with
comity. One rationale to reject full faith and credit with respect to
tribal judgments is precisely because tribal governments are
viewed as sovereigns separate from the United States.
282
Indeed,
courts that rely on comity “analogize tribal courts to foreign
governments.”
283
When tribes are viewed as equivalent to foreign
nations, comity becomes the correct basis on which to uphold
tribal court decisions.
284
Comity “is the recognition which one nation allows within
its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty
and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other
persons who are under the protection of its laws.”
285
In
considering whether to recognize a foreign act, the reviewing
court does not consider whether the judgment is substantively
correct or incorrect. Nor does it weigh the wisdom of the analysis
underlying the judgment. Review is limited to reflect respect for
the sovereignty of the deciding nation’s court.
286
Instead, the
question is whether the judgment is entitled to enforcement.
287
Typically, a marriage will be recognized as long as it was
legal in the “place of celebration.”
288
Consequently, a jurisdiction
281
See Alicia K. Crawford, Comment, The Evolution of the Applicability of ERISA
to Indian Tribes: We May Finally Have Congressional Intent, but It’s Still Flawed, 34 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 259, 272 (2010) (“Due to the importance of tribal sovereignty, U.S. courts
have adhered to comity toward Indian tribes.”); Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 807–
10 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding Congress did not intend to include tribes within the meaning of
“territories and possessions” and thus, Indian court judgments were not entitled to full
faith and credit but only to comity); In ReMarriage of Red Fox, 542 P.2d 918, 920 (Or. Ct.
App. 1975) (“While the decisions of tribal courts are not . . . entitled to the same ‘full faith
and credit’ accorded decrees rendered in sister states, the quasi-sovereign nature of the
tribe does suggest that judgments rendered by tribal courts are entitled to the same
deference shown decisions of foreign nations as a matter of comity.” (footnote omitted)).
282
Garonzik, supra note 269, at 726–27 (“According to tribal sovereignty
advocates, because tribal courts constitute sovereign entities, there is no more obligation
to enforce their judgments than there is to enforce the judgments of the courts of Mexico.”).
283
Tribal Courts, supra note 265, at 905. It is notable that this analogy was
rejected by the Supreme Court inMackey. Id.
284
Garonzik, supra note 269, at 726–27.
285
Hilton, 159U.S. at 164; see alsoAleem v. Aleem, 947 A.2d 489, 499 (Md. Ct. App.
2008) (“[M]ore than mere courtesy and accommodation, comity does not achieve the force of
an imperative or obligation. Rather, it is a nation’s expression of understanding which
demonstrates due regard both to the international duty and convenience and to the rights of
persons protected by its own laws.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
286
Tribal Courts, supra note 265, at 869.
287
Id.
288
Aviel, supra note 213, at 731; see Hilton, 159U.S. at 167 (“A judgment affecting
the status of persons, such as a decree confirming or dissolving a marriage, is recognized
as valid in every country, unless contrary to the policy of its own law.”).
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may recognize a marriage that would be illegal under its own
marriage laws if it was legal at the place of marriage. This issue
typically arises with respect to different rules regarding the age
at which someone may legally wed. Under notions of comity, a
state that prohibits a fifteen-year-old from marrying may
nonetheless recognize that marriage as valid so long as it was
legal in the place of celebration. And so long as it does not violate
“strong public policy.”
289
Comity is particularly appealing because it allows for a
public policy exception to the enforcement of an otherwise valid
judgment.
290
It is perhaps important to stress that comity is
voluntary.
291
Thus, while comity may be expected, no jurisdiction
is actually obliged to enforce any foreign act.
292
Under the public
policy exception, courts will refuse comity for a foreign act if
granting it would be fundamentally at odds with the goals of
comity or its own public policy.
293
Indeed, the Navajo Code already embodies a form of
comity by recognizing marriages performed outside the
reservation if the marriage is valid by the laws of the place of
289
Aviel, supra note 213, at 731, 736 (“Justice Ginsburg reintroduced the
distinction between judgments and choice of law, noting that under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause there was no allowance to ‘reject a judgment from a sister State because you
find it offensive to your policy,’ but that ‘full faith and credit has never been interpreted to
apply to choice of law.’” (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 213, at 31–32)).
Note that the Supreme Court differentiates between a state’s laws and a state’s judgments.
Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (“A court may be guided by the
forum State’s ‘public policy’ in determining the law applicable to a controversy. But [this
Court’s] decisions support no roving ‘public policy exception’ to the full faith and credit due
judgments.” (emphasis and citations omitted)).
290
Aleem, 947 A.2d at 497 (“The comity of nations, we are told . . . is derived
altogether from the voluntary consent of the latter, (the State, within whose territory it is
attempted to make the law of another State obligatory,) and it is inadmissible, when it is
contrary to its known policy, or injurious to its interests; and it is only in the silence of any
positive rule, affirming, or denying, or restraining the operation of any foreign laws, the
Courts of justice presume the tacit adoption of them, by their own government; unless they
are repugnant to its policy or prejudicial to its interests. This also, he assures us: A nation
will not suffer its own subjects to evade the operation of its fundamental policy, or laws; or
to commit fraud in violation of them, by any acts or contracts made with that design, in a
foreign country; and it will judge for itself, how far it will adopt, and how far it will reject,
any such acts or contracts.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
291
Id. at 499.
292
Id.
293
Id.; see Tribal Courts, supra note 265, at 872 (“[T]he acts, laws, and policies of
foreign sovereign nations are enforced in American courts without significant consideration
of the propriety, wisdom, or domestic legal compliance of such sovereign acts. Limitations,
of course, exist where the act of the foreign state is radically inconsistent with domestic
policy or where the procedures by which a judgment was secured do not provide the
rudiments of fairness. Nevertheless, the substantial deference owed to the acts and
judgments of sovereign states generally precludes American courts from inquiring into the
compliance of that judgment with domestic policies, procedures, or even constitutional
values.” (footnotes omitted)).
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celebration.
294
Navajo law also recognizes marriages performed
pursuant to the Navajo Code, which recognizes both traditional
and common law marriages.
295
Nevertheless, the Code excludes
those marriages prohibited by § 2, which deems “[m]arriage
between persons of the same sex is void and prohibited.”
296
The policy exception that makes comity so appealing to
jurisdictions also undercuts the reliance interests of a couple seeking
to have their marriages recognized.
297
For that type of stability, full
faith and credit—which permits no such exception,would be a better
option. The stumbling block remains the pervasive view that full
faith and credit does not apply to marriages.
298
CONCLUSION
After Obergefell and Windsor, the governments the
majority of same-sex married couples encounter in their daily
lives are required to recognize their marital status. Consequently,
they are entitled to the same benefits and are bound by the same
obligations of marriage as opposite-sex married couples under
state and federal law. This uniformity is mandated by the U.S.
Constitution, which requires that states must permit same-sex
couples to wed and that the federal government and all fifty state
governments recognize their marriages.
299
For same-sex couples
who are also citizens of an American Indian nation, however, the
294
See NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 9, §§ 1(A), 3, 4 (“Marriages contracted
outside of Navajo Indian Country are valid within the Navajo Nation if valid by the laws of
the placewhere contracted.”); United States v. Jarvison, 409 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir. 2005).
295
See NAVAJONATIONCODEANN. tit. 9, §§ 1(B), 3, 4 (“Marriages may be validly
contracted within Navajo Indian Country by meeting the requirements of 9 N.N.C. §§ 4
and 5.”); Jarvison, 409 F.3d at 1225.
296
NAVAJONATION CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 2(C).
297
On the other hand, when it comes to marriage recognition, comity’s
exception for “strong public policy” is rather narrow. Aviel, supra note 213, at 731. While
views on marriage are often politically fraught and contentious, it is rare for a state to
refuse to recognize a marriage legally performed in another jurisdiction. Id. at 737–38
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presence of a third sovereign—the tribal government—introduces
a potential inconsistency with respect to their marriages. For
those couples, this third sovereign may or may not permit their
marriage and may or may not recognize their lawful marriage
from another jurisdiction. This is because, while federal and state
defense of marriage acts have been declared unconstitutional,
tribal DOMAs persist unimpeded by the federal Constitution.
Same-sex couples living under a tribal DOMA may avoid
forfeiture of their marital assets by residing off the reservation,
placing their assets outside of their tribe’s jurisdiction, or by
drafting a will to allocate their assets according to their specific
wishes. Beyond that individual protection, tribal solutions should
be consistent with the tribes’ sovereign right to govern and to
legislate on behalf of its citizens. Within that framework, however,
tribes that currently prohibit same-sex marriage should consider
recognizing thesemarriages outright so that all tribalmembers are
afforded equal dignity. Stopping short of that, tribal recognition of
marriages through full faith and credit or comity would permit
marital assets to be used to ensure spousal and family support
continues in the event a tribalmember dies intestate. Tribes opting
to recognize lawful marriages performed in other jurisdictions
would not signify an abdication of sovereignty, but an exercise of it
that is consistentwith the basis uponwhich governments recognize
the lawful acts of other jurisdictions.
